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ABOUT THE 
CHILDREN 
ACHIEVING 
CHALLENGE 
 
In February 1995 shortly after the 
School Board of Philadelphia adopted 
Children Achieving as a systemic reform 
agenda to improve the Philadelphia 
public schools, the Annenberg 
Foundation designated Philadelphia as 
one of a few American cities to receive 
a five-year $50 million Annenberg 
Challenge grant to improve public 
education. 
 
Among the conditions for receiving the 
grant was a requirement to raise two 
matching dollars ($100 million over five 
years) for each one received from the 
Annenberg Foundation and to create 
an independent management structure 
to provide program, fiscal, and 
evaluation oversight of the grant. In 
Philadelphia, a business organization, 
Greater Philadelphia First, assumed this 
responsibility, and with it, the challenge 
of building and sustaining civic support 
for the improvement of public 
education in the city. 
 
Philadelphia’s Children Achieving was a 
sweeping systemic reform initiative. 
Systemic reform eschews a school-by-
school approach to reform and relies on 
coherent policy, improved coordination 
of resources and services, content and 
performance standards, 
decentralization of decision-making, 
and accountability mechanisms to 
transform entire school systems. Led by 
a dynamic superintendent and central 
office personnel, Children Achieving 
was the first attempt by an urban 
district to test systemic reform in 
practice.   
 
EVALUATION OF 
CHILDREN 
ACHIEVING 
 
In 1996 the Consortium for Policy 
Research in Education (CPRE) at the 
University of Pennsylvania and its 
partner, Research for Action (RFA) were 
charged by the Children Achieving 
Challenge with the evaluation of 
Children Achieving. Between the 1995-
1996 and 2000-2001 school years, 
CPRE and RFA researchers interviewed 
hundreds of teachers, principals, 
parents, students, district officials, and 
civic leaders; sat in on meetings where 
the plan was designed, debated, and 
revised; observed its implementation in 
classrooms and schools; conducted two 
system-wide surveys of teachers; and 
carried out independent analyses of the 
District’s test results and other 
indicators of system performance. An 
outline of the research methods used 
by CPRE and RFA is included in this 
report. A listing of the reports on 
Children Achieving currently available 
from CPRE is found below. There will 
be several additional reports released 
in the coming months. New reports will 
be listed and available as they are 
released on the CPRE web site at 
www.gse.upenn.edu/cpre/. 
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CHILDREN 
ACHIEVING’S  
THEORY OF ACTION 
 
To assess the progress and effects of a 
comprehensive reform such as Children 
Achieving, it is essential to understand 
its “theory of action,” that is, the 
assumptions made about what actions 
or behaviors will produce the desired 
effects. A summary of the Children 
Achieving theory of action follows: 
 
Given high academic standards and 
strong incentives to focus their efforts 
and resources; more control over 
school resource allocations, 
organization, policies, and programs; 
adequate funding and resources; more 
hands-on leadership and high-quality 
support; better coordination of 
resources and programs; schools 
restructured to support good teaching 
and encourage improvement of 
practice; rich professional development 
of their own choosing; and increased 
public understanding and support; the 
teachers and administrators of the 
Philadelphia schools will develop, 
adopt, or adapt instructional 
technologies and patterns of behavior 
that will help all children reach the 
District’s high standards. 
 
ADDITIONAL 
READING ON 
CHILDREN 
ACHIEVING 
 
The following publications on the 
evaluation of the Children Achieving 
are currently available through CPRE at 
(215) 573-0700.  
 
• Recruiting and Retaining Teachers: 
Keys to Improving the Philadelphia 
Public Schools (May 2001) 
 
• School Leadership and Reform: 
Case Studies of Philadelphia 
Principals (May 2001) 
 
• Contradictions and Control in 
Systemic Reform: The Ascendancy 
of the Central Office in Philadelphia 
Schools (August 2001) 
 
• Clients, Consumers, or 
Collaborators? Parents and their 
Roles in School Reform During 
Children Achieving, 1995-2000 
(August 2001) 
 
DISCLAIMER 
 
The research reported herein was 
conducted by the Consortium for Policy 
Research in Education and Research for 
Action. Funding for this work was 
provided by Greater Philadelphia First 
and The Pew Charitable Trusts. 
Opinions expressed in this report are 
those of the author, and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of Greater 
Philadelphia First, The Pew Charitable 
Trusts, or the institutional partners of 
CPRE. 
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CHILDREN 
ACHIEVING 
EVALUATION  
1995-2001: 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
 
During the past five years, the 
Consortium for Policy Research in 
Education and Research for Action used 
the research methods indicated below 
in their evaluation of the Children 
Achieving Challenge. 
 
1. 1996-2000 school-level data on 
indicators that made up the 
District’s Performance Responsibility 
Index including student scores on 
the SAT-9, student promotion and 
graduation rates, student 
attendance, and teacher 
attendance. 
 
2. Two census surveys of teachers, the 
first in 1997 and the second in 1999. 
Teachers were asked about reform 
implementation, school conditions, 
and teaching practices. There was a 
greater than 60 percent response 
rate on both surveys. 
 
3. School indicators describing teacher 
and student characteristics in 1996 
and 1999 obtained from the School 
District of Philadelphia’s Information 
Services. These data included school 
enrollment, number of teachers, the 
proportion of students qualifying for 
free or reduced price lunch, among 
other indicators. These data were 
used for descriptive purposes and in 
hierarchical linear and logistic 
regression models to help 
understand the relationships among 
reform implementation, student 
outcomes, and school 
characteristics.   
 
4. Five years (1995-1996 through 1999-
2000) of qualitative research in 49 
schools (26 elementary, 11 middle, 
and 12 high schools) in 14 clusters.  
Qualitative research included: 
interviews of teachers, principals, 
parents, outside partners who 
worked in the schools, and in a few 
cases, students; observations of 
classrooms, SLC meetings, 
professional development sessions, 
and school leadership team 
meetings; and review of school 
documents (School Improvement 
Plan, budget, etc.). Intensive, multi-
year case study research in a subset 
of 25 schools (13 elementary, 5 
middle, and 7 high schools). 
 
5. Interviews of central office and 
cluster staff and observations of 
meetings and other events. 
 
6. Interviews of 40 Philadelphia civic 
leaders (included political leaders, 
leaders in the funding community, 
public education advocates, 
journalists, and business leaders).  
 
In addition, numerous other studies 
conducted during Children Achieving 
informed this evaluation. These 
included: Bruce Wilson and Dick 
Corbett’s three-year interview study of 
middle school students; an evaluation 
of the Philadelphia Urban Systemic 
Initiative in Mathematics and Science 
conducted by Research for Action; the 
Philadelphia Education Longitudinal 
Study conducted by Frank Furstenberg 
at the University of Pennsylvania; and 
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the evaluation of the William Penn 
Foundation’s initiative in two clusters 
conducted by the National Center for 
Restructuring Education, Schools, and 
Teaching.  
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INTRODUCTION:  
THE ROLE OF THE 
CENTRAL OFFICE IN 
REFORM 
 
he central administrators of 
school districts have only rarely 
been the focus of education 
research. Still, the prevailing 
attitude is that districts are either 
irrelevant to or inhibitors of reform. 
Studies of school-based reform efforts 
often conclude that central office 
policies impede innovation. The 
proposals for school choice, charter 
schools, vouchers, and contract schools 
are a response, at least in part, to the 
perceived ineffectiveness of school 
districts. States and the federal 
government, more and more, provide 
funding directly to schools, rather than 
via district central offices. And in 1994, 
the Annenberg Foundation’s $500 
million “Challenge” pledge, the largest 
gift to urban public education ever 
made, bypassed the school district’s 
central offices as a mechanism of 
reform in nearly every site where it 
operated.  
 
The School District of Philadelphia was 
the one exception in the latter case. 
Philadelphia’s Children Achieving, 
funded through a $150 million 
Annenberg Challenge grant,1 was a 
sweeping “systemic reform” initiative.2 
                                                          
1 Of the $150 million, $50 million was provided by 
the Annenberg Foundation, and $100 million from 
local matching contributions.  
 
2  In this report, the term “systemic reform” is used 
to connote an array of reform policies, including 
A relatively new theory of education 
reform, systemic reform eschews a 
school-by-school reform approach and 
relies on the use of content and 
performance standards, 
decentralization, and accountability 
mechanisms to transform entire school 
systems. Led by central office 
personnel, Children Achieving was 
among the first attempts to put a 
systemic reform theory to a test.  
 
In this report, we examine the role of 
the central office in this reform and 
describe its evolution over the course 
of Children Achieving.3 The first section 
of the report recounts how conflicts 
arose about the theory of systemic 
reform, some of the Philadelphia 
reformers’ underlying beliefs and 
values, and the new roles envisioned for 
the central office in the Children 
Achieving reform plan. Central office 
staff struggled with the competing 
demands of accountability, 
decentralization, and equity. What was 
envisioned as a coherent and 
interconnected set of strategies was 
not always implemented or perceived in 
that way. One result of the confusion 
and inconsistencies in reform theory, 
design, and implementation was a 
gradual, but consistent, retreat from 
                                                                                       
content and performance standards, accountability 
mechanisms, and decentralization. We use the term 
“system-wide reform” to refer to reform across 
entire districts, which is not necessarily “systemic 
reform” (i.e., based on standards, accountability, and 
decentralization, as defined above). We use the term 
“standards-based” when we are discussing the 
implications of content and performance standards in 
particular. 
 
3 Results of the reforms are reported in companion 
documents that will be published in mid-2001. For 
the most up-to-date information on these 
publications, please contact CPRE at (215) 573-0700 
or visit our web site: www.gse.upenn.edu/cpre/.   
T
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what initially was a key facet of the 
plan: decentralization of authority from 
the central office to schools.  
 
The second part of the report examines 
the capacity of the school district to 
effectively support the reforms and 
discusses the contextual issues that 
affected implementation. We argue 
that insufficient attention to the 
knowledge, skills, and beliefs of 
educators at all levels of the system as 
well as the alienation of important 
district partners, limited the human, 
social, and fiscal capital available to the 
district. This left the district without the 
resources it needed to take on a reform 
of the magnitude of Children 
Achieving.  
 
The Philadelphia story is neither one of 
unbridled success nor irredeemable 
failure. In addition to notable test score 
improvements highlighted in other 
CPRE reports, Philadelphia created 
content standards in every subject, 
benchmarks at important transition 
grades, and curriculum frameworks for 
every grade. The District also designed 
and implemented complex 
accountability measures for schools, 
reorganized into clusters of schools and 
small learning communities, provided 
new learning opportunities for teachers, 
and wrestled with the implementation 
of systemic reform. But the hopes that 
greeted this ambitious reform when it 
began were never fulfilled. After David 
Hornbeck resigned as Superintendent 
in August 2000, Children Achieving was 
all but dismantled. Our analysis 
suggests that a combination of factors 
contributed to the demise of Children 
Achieving including: flaws in the theory 
of action, flaws in implementation, lack 
of capacity and lack of attention to 
building capacity, and inconsistency by 
stakeholders about the beliefs and 
values underlying the reform effort. The 
final section of the report draws on the 
experience of Philadelphia, both the 
successes and the challenges, to 
provide lessons for other districts taking 
on systemic reform. 
 
BACKGROUND TO 
PHILADELPHIA’S CHILDREN 
ACHIEVING REFORM 
 
The ultimate goal of the Children 
Achieving initiative was to do what “no 
city with any significant number and 
diversity of students” had ever done: 
help “a large proportion of its young 
people achieve at high levels.”4 To do 
that, David Hornbeck, the 
Superintendent who was the primary 
architect of the reform effort, sought to 
transform the entire District, from 
schools to central office. Supported by 
the Annenberg Challenge grant, he 
argued that the District could raise 
student achievement and improve 
teaching and learning by implementing 
standards and a strong accountability 
system, empowering schools by moving 
authority for instructional decisions 
away from the central office, and 
building capacity by providing a host of 
supports for teachers and students. 
Attaining the goal of improved student 
achievement meant implementing 
throughout the District — all at one 
time — a complex set of reform 
initiatives designed to work in concert.  
                                                          
4 School District of Philadelphia, Children Achieving 
strategic action design. Philadelphia: Author, 1995, 
p. i. 
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In our first report on the initiative, we 
described Children Achieving’s theory 
of action this way:  
 
Given high academic standards and 
strong incentives to focus their efforts 
and resources; more control over 
school resource allocations, 
organization, policies, and programs; 
adequate funding and resources; more 
hands-on leadership and high-quality 
support; better coordination of 
resources and programs; schools 
restructured to support good teaching 
and encourage improvement of 
practice; rich professional development 
of their own choosing; and increased 
public understanding and support; the 
teachers and administrators of the 
Philadelphia schools will develop, adopt 
or adapt instructional technologies and 
patterns of behavior that will help all 
children reach the District’s high 
standards.5  
 
Superintendent Hornbeck accepted this 
description as an accurate statement of 
his theory of action.6 
 
The statement above also reflects, in 
essence, the prevailing theory of 
systemic reform.7 “Systemic reformers” 
argue that previous attempts at reform 
                                                          
5 Consortium for Policy Research in Education, 
Research for Action, and OMG Center for 
Collaborative Learning, A first-year evaluation report 
of Children Achieving: Philadelphia’s education 
reform. Philadelphia: Greater Philadelphia First, 
1996. 
 
6 Field notes, September 1996. 
 
7 J. Christman, T. Corcoran, E. Foley, and T. Luhm, 
“Philadelphia’s Children Achieving initiative: The 
promise and challenge of systemic reform in an 
urban school district.” In W. Boyd (ed.), Reforming 
urban school governance: Responses to the crisis of 
performance. Westport, CT: Ablex/Greenwood 
Publishing, in press. 
have largely failed because they were 
too incremental, too narrowly framed, 
and did not attempt to alter the 
“system” itself. They assert that 
previous reforms did not institutionalize 
high expectations for students and 
teachers and did not fundamentally 
alter the roles of those in charge of 
governance and management 
structures. They conclude that a more 
comprehensive strategy that sets 
academic standards, monitors 
accountability, and coheres policy is 
necessary.  
 
BELIEFS AND VALUES 
UNDERLYING THE REFORM 
 
Philadelphia was among the first urban 
school districts to take a systemic 
approach to school reform and to test 
this new theory of school improvement. 
In addition to systemic theory, outlined 
in a ten-point plan,8 Children Achieving 
rested on a particular set of beliefs and 
values. We found these values 
articulated in District documents, in 
speeches made by Superintendent 
Hornbeck and other leaders, in 
interviews with School District staff, and 
in discussions at policy meetings. They 
included: 
 
Primacy of results. Results are what 
matter; how they are achieved is less 
important. 
 
Equity is paramount. The School 
District must be an advocate for the 
poor children it serves. Equity — of 
academic expectations, learning 
                                                          
8 For a detailed description of the Children Achieving 
reform plan, please see our previous reports or 
School District of Philadelphia, Children Achieving 
strategic action design. 
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opportunities and achievement 
outcomes — is a paramount objective. 
All children can learn, and “all” means 
“all.” 
 
School personnel need autonomy to 
meet the needs of their students. 
Those working closest to students know 
what’s best for students, and want and 
need the freedom and authority to act 
on their decisions. Hence, central 
authorities should not prescribe the 
means to achieve the goals lest they 
inhibit local innovation. 
 
Strong incentives are necessary. To 
spur action at the “cluster”9 and school 
level, strong incentives must be 
developed. Incentives might include 
rewards and sanctions for performance 
as well as rewards and sanctions for 
adopting particular strategies or 
behaviors.  
 
Do it all at once. Reform in all aspects 
of the system must occur 
simultaneously and immediately to 
achieve significant results. 
 
These beliefs and values were not 
equally important nor consistently 
apparent over the course of the reform. 
Depending on the central office figure 
leading the effort, the year, or the goal 
of the initiative, one core belief might 
be emphasized over another. 
Sometimes seemingly conflicting beliefs 
co-existed. We will return to these 
beliefs and values throughout this 
                                                          
9 Clusters were created under Children Achieving 
and are the District’s intermediary organizational unit 
between the central office and the schools. Under 
Children Achieving there were 22 clusters in 
Philadelphia, each organized around a 
comprehensive high school and the elementary and 
middle schools that feed into it.   
report, demonstrating how they shaped 
central office policy and reform 
implementation, the relationship 
between schools, clusters, and the 
central office, and the roles of central 
office leaders. 
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POLICY EVOLUTIONS 
 
hen David Hornbeck 
began his job as 
Superintendent in 
Philadelphia, he promised 
to turn the School District “on its 
head.”10 No longer would the central 
office dictate to schools. “Those who sit 
closest to the action are in the best 
position to decide what mix of 
resources…will most effectively 
accomplish the goal of raising student 
achievement.”11 Schools would be given 
what Hill, Harvey, and Campbell12 call 
“freedom of action” through greater 
control over their own resources and 
the ability to make the decisions that 
would most directly impact students. As 
noted above, the “commitment to 
substantial school level autonomy” was 
a central tenet of Children Achieving.13 
 
Exactly what this fundamental change 
in organization meant for the role of the 
central office was unclear from the 
beginning. The blueprint for the 
Children Achieving initiative, the 
Strategic Action Design, stated that the 
new functions of the central office were 
to “set standards, assess progress, 
monitor for equity, and act as a guide 
and provider of resources and 
support.”14 But in practice these 
                                                          
10 School District of Philadelphia, Children Achieving 
strategic action design, p. iv. 
 
11 Ibid, p. III-11. 
 
12 P. Hill, J. Harvey, and C. Campbell, It takes a city. 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000, 
p. 49.  
 
13 School District of Philadelphia, Children Achieving 
strategic action design, p. III-10 
 
14 Ibid, p. iv. 
changes were complex and difficult to 
achieve, as central office staff tried to 
negotiate their work amid the new 
ideas, structures, and policies that 
made up Children Achieving and the 
sometimes-conflicting roles these 
functions suggested for them. 
 
SETTING STANDARDS: 
CENTRALIZED 
DECENTRALIZATION 
 
One of the first major activities of the 
central office staff was to create “world-
class” content standards for 
English/language arts, mathematics, 
science, and the arts. After an eight-
month drafting process involving 
Philadelphia teachers, principals, and 
community members, the content 
standards were circulated for 
widespread review beginning in August 
1996. Content standards for social 
studies, health and physical education, 
and world languages followed in May 
1997. The standards described 
generally what skills and knowledge 
students should acquire in each subject 
and should be able to demonstrate by 
the end of three benchmark grades: 
fourth, eighth, and eleventh. 
 
The development of content standards 
was a departure for a school district 
that had relied on a Standardized 
Curriculum for most of the previous 
decade. Implemented during the 
administration of Hornbeck’s 
predecessor, Constance Clayton, the 
Standardized Curriculum specifically 
delineated what should be taught in 
every grade, as well as when it should 
be taught, including a daily pacing 
schedule. Critics of the Standardized 
W
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Curriculum suggested that it mired 
teachers in traditional ways of teaching 
and de-professionalized the vocation of 
teaching. Sometimes curricula of this 
type are described as “teacher-proof” 
because they are intended to limit the 
ability of individual teachers to 
determine what is taught. In 
Philadelphia, there was not widespread 
resistance to the Standardized 
Curriculum; on the contrary, many 
teachers were comfortable with it. But 
since there was no system for 
monitoring its implementation, we do 
not know how extensively it was 
followed. 
 
Though standards setting was viewed 
as a centralized function, the move 
from the Standardized Curriculum to a 
system of content standards was in 
practice a de facto form of 
decentralization. Under the previous 
administration, the Standardized 
Curriculum identified both the goals for 
student learning and the means of 
getting there. The intent of standards, 
on the other hand, was to define the 
goals for schools, while allowing them 
to choose the means to reach them. 
Although setting the standards was a 
centralized function, leaving the 
curriculum to be defined at the school 
level was consistent with the central 
belief in the need for increased school 
autonomy.  
 
This was the theory expressed in early 
interviews with central office staff. They 
said over and over again how important 
it was to get “decisions down to the 
schools.” They emphasized the role of 
school staff in making decisions about 
how best to serve students. “We are 
not going to mandate how schools are 
to improve,” one central office leader 
noted. Another said, “Among the 
enlightened practitioners there is a 
sense that a lot of the solutions are at 
the local level. They [schools] should be 
creative, make decisions about budget, 
curriculum choice…”15 The idea was 
that the central office would set the 
standards, and schools would figure out 
how to help students achieve them. 
 
Initially, some central office staffers 
interpreted the goal of decentralization 
so literally that almost every action 
proposed by the central office was a 
topic of contention. For example, 
during an October 1996 policy 
meeting, central office staff and other 
influential policy leaders debated 
whether or not efforts should be made 
to improve the capacity of the central 
office to offer curriculum expertise to 
strengthen teachers’ understanding and 
use of the standards. A meeting 
participant described the dilemma:  
 
There is only one pot of money. And so 
if you use it to develop the skills of 
central office staff then you are basically 
saying to the schools, ‘You don’t have 
to use it [central office expertise], but 
we took your resources to develop it.’16 
 
But, not all central office leaders were 
hesitant to take on capacity-building 
roles. Other meeting participants 
argued that it was absolutely necessary 
for the central office to help schools 
make decisions. One noted, “Schools 
need a bridge to the new standards 
and expectations.” Another said, “Local 
schools should be able to come to the 
                                                          
15 Field Notes, April 28, 1998. 
 
16 Field Notes, October 30, 1996. 
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central office for the expertise to 
implement the Children Achieving 
reforms.” Some supported their 
position by giving examples of poor 
decisions made by schools when given 
authority without guidance. “We waste 
millions of dollars every year on 
decentralized textbook purchases. They 
[the materials schools select] are not 
standards-based.”17 
 
These debates about the central office 
role in curriculum policy continued over 
the next several months. To some 
central office leaders, everything 
seemed up for grabs. A good part of 
one early policy meeting was devoted 
to a discussion of the implications of 
the standards’ rhetoric that suggests 
that student outcomes should not vary, 
rather the amount of time allotted for 
students to reach the standards should 
vary, that is, “time is the variable.” In 
that meeting, policy leaders grappled 
with such basic issues as whether 
students should be assigned to grades 
(e.g., first grade, second grade, third 
grade, and so on), whether students 
should be assessed with letter grades 
(e.g., A, B, C, etc.) at all, and whether 
any student should be allowed to “fail.” 
One of them said, “If time is truly the 
variable, a zero doesn’t count anymore. 
It would just be a student taking longer 
to get where they should be according 
to the standards.”18 Another said that 
standards implied a completely 
ungraded system through which 
students could move at their own pace. 
 
Two members of the Superintendent’s 
inner circle were leading this meeting, 
                                                          
17 Field notes, October 30, 1996. 
 
18 Field notes, December 12, 1996. 
and resisted the conclusion that schools 
would have to be ungraded and 
completely eliminate failure. “Take a 
step back,” one of them suggested, “Is 
this central’s decision? If we have 
standards, assessment, and 
accountability, then couldn’t we have it 
different in different schools?”19  
 
These tensions concerning the roles of 
schools in making decisions and the 
role of the central office as a source of 
guidance were apparent throughout 
many early discussions. There were 
debates about whether to develop a 
core group of consultants for the 
central office,20 whether to organize the 
content standards by grade level,21 
whether to create a district list of 
standards-based materials for reading 
and math,22 whether to provide 
professional development for testing of 
culturally and linguistically diverse 
students,23 and whether to fund New 
Standards and portfolio pilot 
programs.24 In each of these cases, at 
least one central office staff member 
expressed confusion about how they 
could faithfully implement Children 
Achieving without impinging on 
schools’ autonomy to make their own 
decisions.  
 
Some of this confusion can be 
attributed to the central office’s limited 
capacity to serve as leaders of an 
                                                          
19 Field notes, December 12, 1996. 
 
20 Field notes, October 30, 1996. 
 
21 Field notes, December 11, 1996. 
 
22 Field notes, March 13, 1997. 
 
23 Field notes, March 13, 1997. 
 
24  Field notes, April 17, 1997. 
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emerging Philadelphia standards 
movement, a subject we address in 
more detail later in this report. But it 
also reflected a lack of clarity about the 
role of the central office in the reform. 
Children Achieving stated that the 
central office would make fewer 
decisions for schools, but that it would 
act as a “guide and provider of 
resources and support” — what we call 
capacity-building. They struggled to 
figure out how to be both more 
“hands-off” and more helpful to 
schools. Several central office leaders 
felt the capacity-building role conflicted 
with the core value of school autonomy. 
They wondered if the central office 
should play any role in capacity-
building, considering the commitment 
to decentralization and the substantial 
investment made in clusters, an 
intermediate organizational unit 
between the central office and the 
schools. Other reform leaders, who 
believed schools would not be able to 
reform themselves alone, felt that the 
central office had to play a role in 
building capacity. There was no 
consensus, however, about what kind of 
support and direction that role implied. 
 
NEW AUTONOMY PERCEIVED 
AS MANDATES BY SCHOOLS 
 
Figuring out the central office’s new 
role was also difficult because the 
capacity of schools varied. Full 
decentralization assumes that schools 
have the know-how and the resources 
to improve student achievement, but 
simply lack the opportunity or authority 
to make the decisions that matter. But, 
in Philadelphia, this was not always the 
case, as we observed in an earlier 
report.25 As the central office in 
Philadelphia tried to relinquish control, 
some school staff experienced their 
new authority as burdensome. With 
limited resources and little support, the 
new responsibilities could be frustrating 
for school staff. As one teacher told us, 
 
When it comes to implementing the 
[Children Achieving reform], how can 
we [implement it] if we have to come 
up with it on our own? There are too 
many top-down commands and not 
enough attention to how the orders 
would be carried out. They come in and 
say, ‘This is what we want. Do it.’ But 
they don’t give you time to learn it or 
implement it. I wish there was [sic] more 
support from the administration.26  
 
This quote belies the core belief in the 
need for school autonomy. Few schools 
and teachers were eager to wrest 
control over all decision-making and 
policy from the central office. And even 
those who were so inclined emphasized 
how little time they had to devote to 
the considerable and important tasks of 
curriculum development and school 
restructuring.  
 
The quote above also points to one of 
the ironies of Children Achieving. Most 
of the policies that were implemented 
as part of Children Achieving, especially 
in the early years of reform, were 
intended to give schools more 
autonomy. But, to school personnel 
these efforts seemed more invasive 
                                                          
25 J. Christman, Guidance for school improvement in 
a decentralizing system: How much, what kind, and 
from where? Philadelphia: Consortium for Policy 
Research in Education, Research for Action, and 
OMG Center for Collaborative Learning, 1998. 
 
26 Teacher, Spring 1997. 
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than the more prescriptive, albeit, 
familiar approaches, such as the 
Standardized Curriculum. Because the 
decision to decentralize was made 
centrally, and designed with little 
consultation with the field, school and 
cluster personnel experienced 
“decentralization” as a set of central 
mandates. For example, we heard 
regular complaints about the undue 
burden of creating and certifying local 
school councils, an aspect of the reform 
that was intended to provide teachers 
and parents more authority over their 
schools. The development of small 
learning communities, which served 
numerous purposes including further 
decentralization, was also criticized by 
some school staff as demanding too 
much of their time and energy.  
 
The creation of clusters — groups of 
schools made up of a comprehensive 
high school and its feeder middle and 
elementary schools — also contributed 
to the perception of creating mandates. 
Twenty-two cluster offices were 
established in Philadelphia, and were 
expected to mobilize resources, and 
provide guidance, focus, and 
professional development. While the 
central office may have thought of 
clusters as a form of decentralization, 
school personnel did not experience 
them that way. The central office 
funneled all communication through the 
clusters and expected the rollout of 
reforms to be supported primarily by 
cluster staff. To schools, clusters were 
simply another layer of bureaucracy 
that decreased rather than increased 
school autonomy.27 
                                                          
27 For a full discussion of school personnel’s reactions 
to clusters, please see a companion document that 
will be published in mid-2001. For the most up-to-
date information on this publication, please contact 
THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL 
PARTNERS AND WORK TEAMS 
 
School staff were critical of the content 
standards, saying that the standards 
and the accompanying Standards 
Curriculum Resource Guide28 did not 
provide them with enough guidance 
about what to teach. Many pined for 
the clarity of the Standardized 
Curriculum.29 Though several central 
policymakers, to their credit, 
recognized this need early in the 
initiative, there was no consensus about 
how much guidance to provide or how 
to provide it.  
 
Two of the School District’s primary 
external partners, the Children 
Achieving Challenge and the 
Philadelphia Education Fund, played 
significant roles in persuading the 
central office to accept a capacity-
building role. Leaders from both groups 
were members of the Executive 
Committee and the Superintendent’s 
Cabinet. They also played primary roles 
in establishing and leading the seven 
work teams charged with developing 
goals, setting priorities, and creating 
                                                                                       
CPRE at (215) 573-0700 or visit our web site: 
www.gse.upenn.edu/cpre/.   
 
28 Published soon after the Content Standards were 
sent out for review, the Standards Curriculum 
Resource Guides were intended to take the place of 
the Instructional Planning Guides and Marking 
Guidelines which teachers had become used to in 
the Standardized Curriculum. But there was much 
dissatisfaction with the replacement guides, and 
many questioned their alignment with the standards 
(Field notes, December 1996). 
 
29 For a full discussion of teachers’ initial reaction to 
the release of the content standards, see E. Simon, E. 
Foley, and C. Passantino, Making sense of standards. 
Philadelphia: Consortium for Policy Research in 
Education, University of Pennsylvania, 1998.  
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annual workplans to implement 
Children Achieving.  
 
In the early stages of the reform effort, 
many important policy discussions took 
place in meetings of work teams and 
work team leaders. During those 
discussions, external partners pushed 
central office staff to recognize the 
need for building capacity in schools 
and clusters. In an illustrative exchange 
during one policy meeting, a member 
of an external partner group challenged 
a central office leader to think in more 
complex ways about what it would take 
to move to a decentralized, standards-
based system. They were debating 
whether to create lists of standards-
based materials in reading and math to 
guide schools in the purchase of 
textbooks and other curriculum 
resources. One central office leader felt 
that the central office simply needed to 
tell the schools to select materials that 
were “standards-driven” and then let 
the schools figure out how to do that. 
She reflected the core belief in school 
autonomy when she said that what the 
central office really needed to do was 
send a memo from the Superintendent 
saying that any materials schools select 
need to be “standards-driven.” She 
asserted that the central office needs to 
“release the control” and that “schools 
need to get responsible.” She 
wondered, “why bring this 
[responsibility] back to the central 
office?”  
 
An external partner disagreed with the 
central office leader voicing this 
opinion. The partner felt that at some 
point schools might be able to take 
more responsibility for selecting 
standards-driven materials, but school 
staff needed to learn how to be “good 
consumers” first. It was the central 
office’s responsibility, therefore, to 
provide schools with guidance and 
support until the time when schools had 
developed the capacity to do it on their 
own. The external partner described 
this as “trying to deal with the vacuum 
in between.”30 
 
Central policymakers found it difficult 
to navigate the “vacuum” that lay 
between a fully centralized and a fully 
decentralized system. To some, a 
District-led effort to build capacity 
seemed to be in conflict with the value 
of school autonomy. If schools were to 
assume control over their own 
destinies, could the central office set 
parameters or legitimately mandate 
specific actions? What supports could 
the central office feasibly supply? How 
strong should signals be about what 
and how to teach? 
 
GUIDANCE THROUGH 
STANDARDS 
 
By the end of the 1996-1997 school 
year, District policy leaders were trying 
to specify which policies would be 
mandated centrally and which would be 
left to the schools and clusters to 
decide. For example, in a curriculum 
policy meeting held with the 
Superintendent, administrators 
developed a summary statement about 
the role of the central office. The first 
two points clarified the central office’s 
role in “standards-driven policy 
development.” 
 
                                                          
30 Field Notes, March 3, 1997. 
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We will mandate standards, graduation 
requirements, assessments, promotion 
policy, some reporting elements, [and 
some] aspects of student responsibility. 
 
Issues of curriculum and instruction 
(graded vs. non[-graded], core 
curriculum, intensive scheduling, etc.) 
will be treated as issues of best 
practice. This means providing 
information as to degrees of flexibility, 
recommending research-based 
practices, [and] developing curriculum 
as resources — but not mandating.31 
 
The first statement spelled out that the 
central office would set standards not 
only for content, but also for 
performance (e.g., graduation, 
promotion). The second statement 
implied a role for the central office as a 
gentle guide in all other aspects of 
curriculum policy. Still trying to remain 
true to the reform’s underlying belief 
that “schools need autonomy,” the 
central office would “provide 
information,” and “recommend” best 
practices, but not mandate their use. 
Signals about curriculum from the 
central office would be suggestions, not 
policy. The goal was, as one central 
office leader noted, to “err on the least 
amount of policy” or mandates, without 
looking “uncaring or unaware” of the 
realities and needs of schools.32 
 
One of the results of this approach was 
that the central office engaged in a 
flurry of standards development, 
consistent with the standards-setting 
                                                          
31 School District of Philadelphia, Standards-driven 
policy development. Philadelphia: Author, 
unpublished manuscript, 1997.  
 
32 Field notes, April 24, 1997. 
 
role initially envisioned in Children 
Achieving. By setting standards of 
practice for various School District 
activities, the central office could signal 
what they believed were the most 
promising approaches without, they 
felt, impinging on schools’ right to 
prescribe their own “treatment.” Over 
the next two years, central office 
personnel created standards of practice 
for many central, cluster, and school 
activities, including: classroom practice, 
testing, professional development, 
early literacy, culturally and linguistically 
diverse students’ graduation and 
promotion requirements, school 
rosters, budgets, small learning 
communities, central office practice, 
equity, cluster practice, and the 
Comprehensive Support Process.33  
 
It is beyond the scope of this evaluation 
to assess the effect of each of these 
sets of standards or to reach 
conclusions about whether their impact 
was positive or negative. It is clear, 
however, that the strategy of 
developing guidelines for, rather than 
mandating, practice was used 
extensively by central office leaders in 
their effort to navigate the new roles 
laid out for them in Children Achieving. 
However, these standards were often 
perceived by the field as mandates, in 
part because the standards were often 
used to evaluate school performance 
(e.g., in the development of small 
learning communities). Schools 
continued to see standards as 
requirements handed down from 
above, rather than as opportunities for 
increased school autonomy. 
                                                          
33 This is not necessarily an exhaustive list. These are 
just the sets of standards of which the evaluation 
team was aware. 
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TRYING TO FILL THE VACUUM: 
CURRICULUM FRAMEWORKS 
 
The process of defining the role of the 
central office in curriculum policy also 
led to the publication of more detailed, 
standards-based curriculum supports. 
The District began to discuss 
development of curriculum frameworks 
as early as December 1996, but it was 
not until after questions about 
“standards-driven policy development” 
were resolved that work on the 
frameworks began in earnest. School 
and cluster staff also helped central 
office leaders to recognize the need for 
more detailed curriculum supports. 
Responses from teachers and schools 
reflected a desire for more specific 
direction than the content standards 
and the accompanying “Standards 
Curriculum Resources” guides and 
helped persuade the central office to 
shift their priority from giving schools 
more freedom of action to offering 
more guidance and resources. The 
“Curriculum Frameworks,” which 
debuted in January 1998, were created, 
in part, because teachers asked for 
them. One of the leaders in this work 
explained: 
 
I’ve never before worked on a 
document that teachers asked for with 
the exception of [the Curriculum 
Frameworks]. Not in 13 years with the 
District. Teachers wanted the support. 
The TLN [Teaching and Learning 
Network, based in the clusters] 
persuaded the central office staff it was 
needed. We were persuaded to do it. 
They needed a bridge between where 
they are and where we want them to 
be.34  
 
Though he noted that at first he felt the 
Curriculum Frameworks were 
antithetical to “what standards-driven 
instruction is about,” he and other 
central office staff altered their stance 
because there was “a reality gap.” 
Rather than leaving it up to teachers, 
schools, and clusters to develop 
standards-based curricula and teaching 
methods by themselves, he came to the 
realization that “we need to build the 
capacity in schools, among teachers.”35 
The Curriculum Frameworks were 
intended to be just the first step in that 
regard, though in reality they turned 
out to be the only published curricular 
resources offered to all teachers. 
 
The Curriculum Frameworks were 
designed to answer the question, 
“What do I need to do to get my 
students to achieve these standards?” 
They fleshed out the academic content 
standards and were organized by 
grade, defined grade-specific skills and 
content, and offered suggestions for 
units and activities that addressed the 
content standards. 
 
The Curriculum Frameworks refrained 
from mandating a specific curriculum, 
but they did identify constructivism as 
the pedagogical philosophy underlying 
the District standards. Constructivism 
emphasizes the student’s active 
engagement in his or her own learning 
and advocates hands-on instructional 
approaches. In the overview of the 
                                                          
34 Field notes, April 27, 1998. 
 
35 Field notes, April 27, 1998. 
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Curriculum Frameworks, its authors 
advocated constructivist practices.36  
 
[Earlier curriculum materials] stress skill 
development through practice, drill, 
and memorization; the standards stress 
constructivist learning by understanding 
and applying knowledge…The ways of 
teaching and learning reflected in the 
earlier documents are not appropriate 
for preparing all students to meet the 
high standards set forth in the 
Philadelphia standards.37 
 
The publication of the Curriculum 
Frameworks marked the first instance 
during the Children Achieving reform 
era when the central office had stated 
that the Philadelphia standards implied 
a specific approach to instruction. Until 
then, the rhetoric from the central 
office had been that any instructional 
approach that worked to help students 
meet the standards was acceptable and 
appropriate, consistent with the core 
belief that results, not means, were 
what mattered. By asserting the 
desirability of the constructivist 
approach, the central office made a 
clear departure from this core belief. 
 
                                                          
36 It is important to note that standards are not 
inherently constructivist, though some advocates of 
standards advocate this pedagogical approach. 
Standards could just as easily be linked to more 
traditional pedagogy. 
 
37 School District of Philadelphia, Curriculum 
frameworks. Philadelphia: Author, 1998, p. 2. A later, 
revised version of the Curriculum Frameworks stated 
the connection between standards and 
constructivism more strongly: “One of the major 
theories about teaching and learning on which the 
standards movement in Philadelphia and elsewhere 
has been based is constructivism” (School District of 
Philadelphia web site, 
http://www.philasch.k12.pa.us/offices/curriculum/fra
meworks/standriv/index.htm). 
RESPONSE TO THE 
CURRICULUM FRAMEWORKS 
 
The Curriculum Frameworks were well 
received by teachers, especially those 
at the elementary and middle school 
levels. More than 46 percent of 
teachers who responded to a teacher 
survey conducted by CPRE in 1999 felt 
that the Curriculum Frameworks had 
helped them change their teaching 
methods. Still many complained that 
the guidance offered through the 
Curriculum Frameworks was not 
enough. Over half of teachers agreed 
“somewhat” or “strongly” with the 
statement that the frameworks were 
“too vague about the content to be 
covered to be helpful with my lesson 
planning.” Leaders of the Philadelphia 
Federation of Teachers (PFT) 
complained repeatedly that the 
Curriculum Frameworks did not offer 
new teachers enough guidance about 
what to teach, an omission that a PFT 
representative claimed was contributing 
to Philadelphia’s high teacher attrition 
rate.38  
 
The Curriculum Frameworks advocated 
a radically different approach to 
instruction than was the norm in the 
School District of Philadelphia. The 
pedagogical approach advocated in the 
frameworks, constructivism, was neither 
widely practiced nor widely understood 
by the city’s teachers. As illustrated in 
an earlier CPRE report,39 prior to 
publication of the Curriculum 
Frameworks, teachers had only a 
superficial understanding of the 
                                                          
38 Field notes, June 5, 2000. 
 
39 Simon, Foley, and Passantino, Making sense of 
standards.  
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implications of content standards for 
their practice. Typically, they used the 
standards as checklists, to check off the 
topics covered. They saw the standards 
as having relevance for the content of 
their courses, but not for their teaching 
practice or for student performance. 
This was not surprising given how little 
opportunity teachers had been given to 
discuss the standards and how little 
support they received with curricular 
reviews. 
 
Two years after the standards were 
adopted, with the publication of the 
Curriculum Frameworks and more time 
to absorb what the standards implied 
for their practice, we found that more 
teachers were moving toward 
standards-based instruction. However, 
the typical teacher’s practice was still 
far from the kind of teaching described 
in the introduction to the Curriculum 
Frameworks. In an intensive study of 
classrooms in 1997-1998, we found that 
most lessons lacked intellectual rigor, 
and content difficulty and expectations 
for students were both low. Some 
teachers continued to ignore the 
standards and curriculum frameworks, 
especially high school teachers. As the 
central office staff began to understand 
just how much instruction had to 
change, they began to consider 
stronger signals to induce reform. 
 
SEND STRONGER SIGNALS 
TO ENSURE EQUITY 
 
In addition to capacity-building and 
setting standards, Children Achieving 
defined two other roles for the central 
office: monitoring equity and holding 
School District staff accountable for 
student achievement. These two 
functions were combined in the 
Professional Responsibility Index, the 
District’s primary accountability 
mechanism, which included measures 
of both student achievement and 
equity. Equity and accountability 
concerns were also addressed through 
the graduation and promotion supports 
and requirements and the citywide 
proficiency exams.40 
 
In the following section we describe 
how the central office’s interpretation 
of these two roles led it to develop 
stronger and more prescriptive signals 
to schools about what and how to 
teach. We also show how equity 
concerns naturally led to an emphasis 
on education inputs — such as 
resources, course content, and teaching 
quality — that conflicted with the core 
value that “results are what matter.” 
Finally, we reveal what we believe to be 
a contradiction inherent in the design 
of Children Achieving and in the theory 
of systemic reform in general: Well-
aligned accountability and assessment 
systems presume a uniform curriculum. 
Therefore teachers and schools cannot 
determine their curriculum 
autonomously. Systemic reform 
promises both alignment and 
autonomy, without acknowledging the 
trade-offs between the two.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
40 The Comprehensive Support Process (CSP) was 
also a major equity initiative. For a full explanation of 
the CSP, please see E. Foley, Restructuring student 
support services: Redefining the role of the school 
district. Philadelphia: Consortium for Policy Research 
in Education, University of Pennsylvania, 1998. 
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A NOBLE PREOCCUPATION 
WITH EQUITY 
 
One of the core beliefs underlying the 
Children Achieving reforms was an 
emphasis on equity, exemplified by the 
statement we heard over and over 
again from the Superintendent and 
other central office leaders: “All 
children can learn at high levels, and 
‘all’ means ‘all.’”41 The blueprint for the 
reform asserted that every child would 
benefit from Children Achieving 
“including those from low-income 
families, racial and language minorities, 
students with disabilities, and other 
populations we have historically 
failed.”42 There was consistent attention 
to equity issues in policy meetings, and 
all new policies were considered in 
terms of their potential effects on 
equity. “Everything can be equity,” one 
policy leader told us.43 Central office 
staff took a suspicious view of policies 
adopted by the Philadelphia Board of 
Education that were perceived as 
exclusive, such as the reinstitution of 
admission requirements in some small 
learning communities and the creation 
of elite magnet programs, and they 
were reluctant to implement them.44 
 
Many central office staff members felt 
that this focus on equity was the 
hallmark of the reform. 
 
                                                          
41 For example, field notes, February 19, 1998 and 
April 1, 1999. 
 
42 School District of Philadelphia, Children Achieving 
strategic action design, p. I-1. 
 
43 Field notes, July 3, 1997.   
 
44 Field notes, April 1, 1998 and May 14, 1998. 
If there is a legacy, it will be that all kids 
are included and that we should have a 
stake in having all children achieve. 
That is the real contribution David 
[Hornbeck] has made…45 
 
With the passionate support of the 
Superintendent himself, the primacy of 
this core belief never wavered 
throughout the reform effort and only 
grew in importance among central 
office leaders as the reform progressed. 
 
THE LINK BETWEEN EQUITY 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Monitoring equity and enforcing 
accountability were highly linked in 
Children Achieving. A key strategy for 
encouraging school personnel to make 
the commitment to equity was to 
develop and implement an 
accountability policy that would compel 
schools to pay attention to the 
achievement of every student. The 
Professional Responsibility Index, or 
PRI, was an annual score for every 
school in the system based on several 
indicators of performance:  
 
• Student scores on standardized 
tests of reading, mathematics, and 
science (Stanford-9 Achievement 
Test);  
 
• Either the promotion rate (in 
elementary and middle schools) or 
the persistence-to-graduation rate 
(in secondary schools); and 
 
• Teacher and student attendance 
rates.  
 
                                                          
45 Field notes, November 1999. 
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Every two years, schools were rewarded 
or sanctioned based on their progress 
on two accountability goals: (1) meeting 
or surpassing their PRI growth target 
and (2) decreasing the average 
proportion of students scoring at the 
lowest levels on the three portions of 
the SAT-9. The latter provision was 
included to prevent schools from 
“creaming,” that is, only testing their 
brightest students, and to induce 
schools to treat all students as having 
the potential to perform at high levels 
on the SAT-9. Additionally, an element 
of the first goal, the growth target, also 
was intended to promote more equal 
treatment of students. Schools were 
awarded points toward their growth 
target simply for testing students, 
regardless of the students’ actual 
scores on the test. In the first 
accountability cycle, some high schools’ 
average achievement actually 
decreased, but they were able to reach 
their growth target by including more 
students in the testing program. 
 
Rewarding schools for testing students 
had a major impact on inclusion in 
testing. The proportion of special 
education and culturally and 
linguistically diverse students tested 
increased significantly in the first 
accountability cycle.46 While overall 
achievement improved annually, data 
disaggregated by race/ethnicity, family 
income, gender, English language 
proficiency, and disability showed large 
gaps, some of which grew over the 
course of Children Achieving.47 Central 
                                                          
46 D. Hornbeck and G. Ingram, Policy 102 progress 
and plans: December 15, 1998. Philadelphia: School 
District of Philadelphia, 1998. 
 
47 Ibid. 
 
office staff reacted emotionally to data 
that showed certain groups of students 
falling behind their peers. For example, 
in 1998, the four-year graduation rate 
was almost 30 points lower for students 
in families on welfare (39.9 percent) 
than for all other students (67.2 
percent). The four-year graduation rate 
for Latino students overall was only 
37.1 percent.48 Fifteen percent fewer 
eleventh grade African American boys 
scored at or above basic in reading in 
1998 (18.8 percent) than their female, 
African American counterparts (33.8 
percent). More than half of White 
students (54 percent), on the other 
hand, scored at or above basic on the 
reading test that year.49 
 
Examining these results in a policy 
meeting, one central office leader 
described herself as “heartsick.”50 
Another summarized: “Areas of deep 
concern are for low-income students, as 
well as Latino and African American 
students, especially those who are male 
and especially at higher levels of 
schooling.”51 
 
In order to hold schools accountable for 
results, the School District needed to 
measure results, but measurement 
spotlighted the alarming inequity of 
outcomes across the District. This noble 
preoccupation with equitable outcomes 
naturally led central office leaders to 
question the equity of inputs, even 
though as one high-level staff member 
put it, “focuses on inputs are not in 
                                                          
48 Ibid, p. 8. 
 
49 Ibid, p. 11. 
 
50 Field notes, April 1, 1999. 
 
51 Ibid. 
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sync with a standards-driven system.”52 
“Focusing on inputs,” that is 
determining which student populations 
were receiving which resources and 
supports, conflicted with the core value, 
expressed in the blueprint for the 
Children Achieving reform, that results 
are what matter. “Input” issues that 
arose over the course of the reform 
included: the differences in per-pupil 
funding between Philadelphia and its 
surrounding districts, the quality of 
teaching, the lack of uniformity in 
course content, the effects of 
uncertified teachers on student 
achievement, student access to elite 
small learning communities and magnet 
programs, and the distribution of 
programs for gifted and talented 
students, among others. The low 
achievement of English language 
learners and minority, low-income, and 
disabled students, and the slow pace of 
change, also served as pressures on 
central office leaders to develop 
stronger signals to schools about what 
and how to teach. 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
OPPORTUNITY-TO-LEARN AND 
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 
 
The connection between equity and 
accountability was also apparent as 
central office staff began to think about 
ways to address student accountability 
for achievement. District leaders saw a 
strong connection between students’ 
accountability for their academic 
performance and the “inputs” 
discussed above, which were termed 
“fair opportunities to learn.” While they 
lamented some school staff members’ 
                                                          
52 Field notes, February 18, 1998. 
low expectations of students, 
particularly of students in historically 
underserved groups, they also 
recognized a need to encourage 
students to make efforts to achieve at 
high levels. A central office leader told 
us, “Now that school-level 
accountability has been instituted, we 
have to balance that with student-level 
accountability.”53 
 
When the PRI was first implemented, 
schools became accountable for 
student achievement, but there was no 
district policy incentive to encourage 
students to do their best on the tests, 
to work hard in school, or to take their 
own education seriously. However, 
neither the central office staff nor the 
Board of Education members felt that 
implementation of student 
accountability was possible without a 
concerted effort to provide students 
with the necessary supports for success. 
Without these supports — high-quality 
instruction, opportunities for 
remediation, access to summer school, 
and rich learning resources — students 
could not be justifiably held to 
performance standards in their view. 
 
The graduation and promotion 
supports and requirements along with 
the citywide proficiency examinations 
were expected to be the School 
District’s primary methods for finding 
that balance. Opportunity-to-Learn 
standards were envisioned in the initial 
blueprint for the Children Achieving 
reform but were never fully developed. 
The Graduation and Promotion 
Supports and Requirements, adopted 
in June 1998, did articulate some of the 
                                                          
53 Field notes, November 1999. 
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supports to which students were 
entitled, and one District leader 
consistently referred to these as “one 
kind of opportunity-to-learn 
standards.”54 
 
The Graduation and Promotion 
Supports and Requirements were 
scheduled to take effect beginning in 
the 1999-2000 school year.55 This 
ambitious and extensive set of policies 
included descriptions of the 
“interlocking commitment needed from 
key parties to ensure that all children 
have the opportunity to learn,” the 
“instructional supports necessary to 
raise achievement levels,” and the new 
requirements for admission to grades 5 
and 9 and for graduation. The Board 
adopted the new policies on the 
condition that the graduation and 
promotion requirements, such as 
passing all major courses, would be 
enforced only if the supports were 
available, such as increased 
instructional time for at-risk students. 
 
CITYWIDE PROFICIENCY 
EXAMS 
 
Included in the graduation and 
promotion requirements was a 
provision for developing citywide 
proficiency exams for grades 7 through 
12 in all major subjects. To be 
promoted from eighth grade and to 
graduate, the new policies required 
that students pass all their major 
courses, as well as the SAT-9 or the 
proficiency exam. Additionally, scores 
                                                          
54 Field notes, May 14, 1998 and December 3, 1998. 
 
55 Due to funding limitations, only the requirements 
for entrance to fifth grade were enforced in June 
2000. 
on the proficiency tests would be 
calculated into the final grade of all 
students in grades 7-12. By spring 
2000, proficiency exams had been 
developed and piloted in English I and 
II, algebra I and II, geometry, integrated 
math I, living environment I, and 
physical science I and II. Development 
of assessments in social studies, as well 
as in all subjects in other grades, would 
be developed over the next several 
years, but their future is in doubt under 
the post-Hornbeck administration. 
 
Central office leaders greatly 
anticipated the development and 
implementation of the proficiency 
exams. Less than a year after the 
development of the Curriculum 
Frameworks, they looked to the 
proficiency exams to provide stronger 
incentives to signal to teachers what, 
and how, to teach. Increasingly less 
concerned with the need to give school 
personnel freedom to make curricular 
decisions, central office leaders 
developed these more prescriptive 
approaches in the name of equity. 
Again, this highlighted a conflict 
between two of the reform’s core 
values: the need for strong incentives 
and the emphasis on school autonomy. 
And again, school autonomy lost. 
During one policy meeting where 
central office leaders discussed the 
need to increase the rigor and similarity 
of course content across the District, 
one individual explained to the group 
how the proficiency exams would take 
precedence over the Curriculum 
Frameworks in identifying curriculum 
content for teachers. “[The citywide] 
finals will determine what’s in the 
Algebra courses. And what’s in the 
other subjects will be determined by 
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the finals as well.”56 In an interview in 
December 1998, a central office leader 
described the citywide finals as, “the 
tail that wags the dog. When we 
publish the scope and sequence, they 
[teachers] will finally know what they 
have to teach…” During the meetings 
we observed, there was no discussion 
about the influence of the tests on 
pedagogy. It seemed to be assumed 
that the tests would drive the kind of 
instruction — constructivism — that 
district leaders supported. It is 
important to note that proficiency 
exams were for middle schools and 
high schools only, the two school levels 
at which Children Achieving had the 
least success.57 
 
Central office leaders believed that the 
addition of penalties and rewards for 
student performance on the proficiency 
exams would make them harder for 
teachers to ignore.58 Developed in 
collaboration with the American 
Institutes for Research, the proficiency 
exams were based on the Curriculum 
Frameworks, but more detailed than 
the frameworks. The specifications 
weren’t available until October 1999, 
but by that time, central policymakers 
seemed to have accepted the premise 
that these new examinations would 
                                                          
56 Field notes, December 3, 1998. 
 
57 For a description of the impact of reform on 
schools, please see a companion document that will 
be published in mid-2001. For the most up-to-date 
information on this publication, please contact CPRE 
at (215) 573-0700 or visit our web site: 
www.gse.upenn.edu/cpre/.  
 
58 Due primarily to logistical problems and funding 
uncertainties, the citywide finals were not used as 
part of the School District’s graduation and 
promotion requirements. That is, finals were not 
calculated into a student’s grade or used for 
promotion or graduation decisions.  
 
serve as incentives for teachers, clearly 
signaling to them what to teach. This 
exchange between a CPRE interviewer 
and a School District leader illustrates 
the point: 
 
CPRE:  In the ideal, what should 
teachers consider when they 
decide what to teach? 
 
SDP:  In the ideal? [They should 
consider] the standards and 
we have benchmarks at 
grades 4, 8, and 11. They 
should refer to our 
frameworks and our content 
standards. 
 
CPRE:  What incentives exist for 
them to do that? 
 
SDP:  The development of the 
proficiency exams. The exams 
are built around the 
frameworks. They need to 
use those resources if they 
want their kids to do well on 
the exams. The work comes 
directly from the frameworks. 
This year will set the tone… 
 
We have the test specs that 
come from the Curriculum 
Frameworks. The proficiency 
exams will come from the test 
specs. And teachers will 
figure out the things that they 
are not covering, that they 
are not teaching. Also, 
people will figure out you 
can’t offer sports math and 
do well on an algebra exam; 
so it will [end up] redesigning 
courses of study.  
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CPRE:  So you really see these exams 
as a driver of instruction? 
 
SDP:  We’re designing them that 
way.59 
 
With this prescriptive approach — using 
the proficiency exams to delineate 
course content and instruction — the 
central office made a dramatic shift 
from the early emphasis on school 
autonomy. This shift, however, was 
consistent with the pressures, and 
perhaps the flaws, of systemic reform. 
A well-aligned accountability and 
assessment system demands a uniform 
curriculum and the development of 
proficiency exams was simply another 
step in that direction. The exams were 
clearly intended to drive instruction, 
making any assertion false that said 
schools could determine the means to 
get results for which they were being 
held accountable. 
 
EXPLAINING THE SHIFT 
AWAY FROM SCHOOL 
AUTONOMY 
 
The shift in the central office role from a 
focus on decentralization to more 
prescriptive approaches was partly a 
result of frustration with the slow pace 
of change. Senge, Cambron-McCabe, 
Lucas, Smith, Dutton, and Kleiner60 
identify an emphasis on top-down 
mandates as a common (but ineffective) 
                                                          
59 Field notes, November 1999. 
 
60 P. Senge, N. Cambron-McCabe, T. Lucas, B. Smith, 
J. Dutton, and A. Kleiner, Schools that learn: A fifth 
discipline fieldbook for educators, parents, and 
everyone who cares about public education. New 
York: Doubleday, 2000. 
 
response to low student performance 
and persistent inconsistencies from 
classroom to classroom. Looking back 
on the implementation of Children 
Achieving, several central office staff 
told us that they had relied too much 
on decentralization in the beginning. As 
one told us, when Children Achieving 
began she had been in favor of: 
 
Pushing money down to schools. In 
theory this is what we should do. But I 
don’t think it’s worked….Some schools 
are doing OK. But I go in plenty of 
schools where the principals don’t even 
know all of their funding sources. I think 
we do need to tie money to outcomes 
in a way. We need to be more 
prescriptive about what schools do with 
money when they’re not performing.61 
 
Another central office leader indicated 
that the early focus on decentralization 
had led to confusion in the field. He 
also concluded that central needed to 
make decisions with more certainty. 
 
We were very ambivalent about the 
balance between central and local 
decision-making — it caused a lot of 
confusion. There was too much 
emphasis on school-based decision-
making at the beginning. We need 
strong central decision-making.62 
 
Central office staff felt that 
decentralization placed too much of a 
burden on schools, and that many 
schools weren’t ready to take more 
responsibility for the work of reform. In 
the absence of school time, interest, 
and/or capacity to make curricular 
                                                          
61 Field notes, March 2000. 
 
62 Field notes, November 1999. 
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decisions, central office should fill the 
void. 
 
The theory is that eventually schools 
should be able to do all these things for 
themselves. But, is that practical 
without more help in the schools? If 
schools got more help, maybe, but we 
can’t afford it. I don’t see how. 
Somebody has got to do this work. If 
we [central office personnel] don’t, 
who’s going to do it?63  
 
The accountability system in particular 
placed considerable pressure on the 
whole district to improve, especially 
when combined with the core belief in 
“doing it all at once.” As the PRI 
growth targets became harder to reach 
without significant improvements in 
student achievement, concerns rose 
about how to compel school personnel 
to engage in reforming their practice. 
Schools could eke only so much 
“growth” from the PRI’s non-testing 
elements. Promotion rates and student 
and staff attendance rates were already 
high in most elementary and middle 
schools, persistence rates were not very 
malleable, and after an initial explosion 
in the proportion of students tested, 
increases in that area leveled off as 
well. Some central office leaders felt 
that unless school personnel were 
forced to improve curriculum and 
instruction, the credibility of the entire 
reform was in jeopardy. This excerpt 
from our field notes describes one 
leader’s concerns. 
 
‘The further along we go without 
paying enough attention to curriculum 
and instruction, more and more schools 
                                                          
63 Field notes, April 1997. 
 
are not going to meet their 
[accountability] targets.’ He feels that 
this will undermine the accountability 
system, as the goals set for progress 
become ‘unrealistic.’ ‘The goals must 
be attainable and staff must feel that 
the incentive system has integrity and is 
reasonable.’64  
 
Central office leaders became 
convinced that more prescriptive 
approaches were necessary. As one of 
them told us, “If we keep pushing 
accountability without pushing 
curriculum and instruction, we could 
bring the system down.” 
 
REFORM OVERLOAD:  
THE EFFECT OF “DOING IT  
ALL AT ONCE” 
 
Another factor that played a part in the 
evolution of the central office role over 
the course of Children Achieving was 
the pressure of the core belief that the 
whole system must be reformed 
simultaneously and immediately. 
“Doing it all at once” created reform 
overload throughout the School 
District, from schools to the central 
office. It was a strong contributor to 
school staff’s inability to focus their 
efforts around clearly defined and 
manageable instructional priorities. 
Cluster staff worked hard to win 
teacher support and to assist them, but 
they were hampered by the sheer 
number of District initiatives and 
directives that they had to implement. 
Many clusters were unable to fully 
develop or implement their own reform 
strategies because so much time was 
spent promoting and disseminating 
                                                          
64 Field notes, November 4, 1999. 
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information about new central office 
policies and programs that the schools 
were required to implement.  
 
Some central office staff, particularly 
those who were not among the 
Superintendent’s close advisers, were 
also overwhelmed by the volume of 
reform initiatives. This concern was 
evident very early in the Children 
Achieving initiative. In an early policy 
meeting, when several of the 
Superintendent’s inner circle had left 
the room, one central office leader said 
“We need to talk about priorities and 
make some tough, hurtful choices and 
let the chips fall where they may. We 
can’t pretend anymore that we can do 
it all.” Another central office leader 
agreed using the analogy that “We 
can’t plow all the streets. Which ones 
are most important?” He suggested 
that focus should be placed on a group 
of schools or a few clusters.65 But when 
the inner circle members returned and 
the other participants briefed them on 
what happened in their absence, there 
was no mention of the concern about 
reform overload.  
 
This reluctance to tell the 
Superintendent and his closest staff 
about the difficulty of “doing it all at 
once” continued throughout the reform 
effort. In an interview two years after 
the exchange quoted above, a District 
leader told us:  
 
I’ve got to tell you something else. We 
are on innovation overload! As hard as 
it is for a Superintendent in a large 
district, someone has to have the guts 
to say it…Everyone is tired…[Central 
                                                          
65 Field notes, November 1996. 
 
office personnel] are having to learn 
something new all the time, we’re 
rolling out so many competing forces. 
[Begins counting on his fingers.] We 
have the CSP. We have SLC. We have 
School-to-Career. We have service 
learning. We have multidisciplinary 
projects. And there is more to come. 
That is just one hand! We have 
judgments against us in federal courts 
that push us to make things not fall 
through the cracks…There’s always a 
new priority.66  
 
The urgency of “doing it all at once” 
created pressure on central office staff 
simply to “roll out” the reforms and 
move on to the next priority. There was 
little time to support or guide the 
reforms or to receive feedback from the 
field and review and revise policy. It is 
not surprising that, to schools and 
clusters, central office policy felt like 
unsupported mandates. The core value 
of “doing it all at once” increased the 
top-down mandates by the central 
office, conflicting with the core value of 
school autonomy. 
 
SUMMARY OF CORE VALUES’ 
EFFECT ON CENTRAL OFFICE 
ROLE 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the effects of the 
core values and the four roles of the 
central office outlined in Children 
Achieving — standards setting, 
capacity-building, holding schools 
accountable, and monitoring equity — 
on School District policy. It shows how 
the values of school autonomy, the 
need for incentives and the primacy of 
results initially led the central office 
                                                          
66 Field notes, December 1998. 
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toward decentralization and the 
avoidance of mandates. But, equity 
concerns and the need to reform the 
system simultaneously and immediately 
pushed the central office in the 
opposite direction, toward more 
prescription. 
In the next section of the report, we 
examine the capacity of the central 
office and the contextual and 
implementation issues that help explain 
this shift away from school autonomy.
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. DIAGRAM OF CORE BELIEFS AND VALUES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON CENTRALIZATION 
AND DECENTRALIZATION IN THE SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA 
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THE CAPACITY OF 
THE CENTRAL OFFICE 
AND THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF 
CHILDREN 
ACHIEVING 
 
 
fter several years of reform, 
central office leaders believed 
that taking a more 
prescriptive approach than 
was initially envisioned in Children 
Achieving was their only recourse for 
improving instruction. But, the direction 
in which central office leaders chose to 
take Children Achieving was also 
influenced by the central office’s 
capacity to support the reforms and 
their perceptions of school capacities. 
In this section, we focus on the financial 
resources, human capital, and social 
capital of the central office, and 
describe how serious limitations in 
those areas led to missteps in 
implementation. We also discuss the 
effects of contextual issues on the 
implementation of the reform, and their 
impact, in turn on the capacity of the 
central office.  
 
THE CAPACITY OF THE 
CENTRAL OFFICE 
 
Spillane and Thompson67 present a 
three-part definition of the capacity of 
                                                          
67 J.P. Spillane and C.L. Thompson, “Reconstructing 
conceptions of local capacity: The local education 
agency’s capacity for ambitious instructional reform.” 
school districts. The three elements of 
capacity they identify include: 
 
• Financial resources allocated to 
staffing, time, and materials;  
 
• Human capital, or the commitment, 
disposition and knowledge of 
district staff; and 
 
• Social capital, or the relationships 
among school district staff that 
create (or hinder the creation) of 
positive group norms, such as 
collaboration, trust, etc.  
 
We begin by discussing the School 
District’s financial resources.  
 
FINANCIAL RESOURCES 
 
Philadelphia is not a wealthy city. Due 
to a drastic decline in the number of 
jobs available, White/middle class flight 
from the city, and a changing economy, 
Philadelphia’s population decreased 
dramatically from the 1970’s to the 
1980’s, and so did its middle class tax 
base. During that decade, the total 
population of the five largest U.S. cities 
— Philadelphia among them — 
decreased by nine percent, while the 
population living in poverty grew by 22 
percent.68 When David Hornbeck began 
his tenure as Superintendent, the city 
was still recovering from a serious fiscal 
crisis in which it was forced to borrow 
$150 million from its employee pension 
                                                                                       
Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 19 (1997), 
pp. 185-203. 
 
68 W.J. Wilson, The truly disadvantaged: The inner 
city, the underclass, and public policy. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1987, p. 46. 
A
26       Contradictions and Control in Systemic Reform 
 
fund just to stay afloat. And with its 
credit severely damaged, the city had 
to pay more than $5 million to obtain 
the loan, a fee equivalent to a 24 
percent interest rate.69 
 
With that history as a backdrop, the city 
refused to provide significant additional 
resources for Children Achieving, 
arguing that it had “stretched its taxing 
ability to the limit.”70 But the full 
implementation of Children Achieving 
required significant additional funding, 
more than the $30 million generated 
annually by the grant,71 and its design 
assumed that more funding would be 
forthcoming. Launching the initiative 
was a calculated risk that the 
Annenberg Challenge grant could be 
used to improve performance, and that 
improved performance would generate 
the political will to obtain increased 
funding either through the city, the 
courts, or the legislature. By 1997, the 
Superintendent, the Board of 
Education, the City Council, and the 
Mayor all agreed that it was the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that 
was not upholding its fair share of the 
costs of educating Philadelphia’s 
students. 
 
But, state officials did not see it that 
way.72 They believed that funds were 
                                                          
69 M. de Courcy Hinds, “A $150 million loan buys 
Philadelphia some time,” The New York Times (1991, 
January 6), p. 14. 
 
70 School District of Philadelphia, Realities converge, 
revisited: School district sees gains on test scores 
and management efficiencies, but fiscal crisis is at 
hand. Philadelphia: Author, 1998, p. 26. 
 
71 Though a significant source of discretionary funds, 
the $30 million from the Annenberg Challenge grant 
was equal to only about two percent of the $1.5 
billion annual budget. 
 
being used inefficiently in Philadelphia 
and that the District’s teacher contract 
was a major obstacle to improvement. 
In their view better management and a 
better contract were prerequisites for 
additional state funds. The state did 
provide Philadelphia with some one-
time grants in addition to the funding 
from the formula, but these were small 
in comparison to what the School 
District said it required to support the 
Children Achieving reform agenda. The 
School District and the city used many 
strategies to induce the state to 
provide additional funding — multiple 
lawsuits, brinksmanship, public scolding 
— to no avail. Fiscal crises became one 
of the few constants of the Children 
Achieving reform era. 
 
Without new financing from the state, 
per pupil funding in Philadelphia was 
well below what was spent in its 
surrounding areas. In 1997, Philadelphia 
spent $6,812 on each public school 
child. Compared to wealthy suburban 
school districts such as Jenkintown, 
Lower Merion, and Radnor, the gap was 
as much as $5,443 per student.73 
Teacher salaries were also higher in 
                                                                                       
72 The funding that Pennsylvania provides to each 
school district currently is based on a funding 
formula which takes into account the number of 
pupils, the special needs of the district, its ability to 
raise local taxes, and other factors. However, the 
state froze the formula in 1993, which meant that 
state aid to the District did not rise in response to 
increases in enrollment and poverty in Philadelphia. 
In actual dollars on a per-pupil basis adjusted for 
inflation, the real value of state education funds 
coming to Philadelphia annually between 1993 and 
1998 actually decreased by 5.9 percent. (See J. 
Century, A citizen’s guide to the Philadelphia school 
budget. Philadelphia: Greater Philadelphia First, 
1998.) 
 
73 School District of Philadelphia, Realities converge, 
revisited, p. 11. 
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suburban areas. Starting salaries in the 
suburbs were more than $3,500 higher 
than starting salaries in Philadelphia 
and maximum salaries were more than 
$9,000 higher.74 Average teacher 
salaries in Philadelphia also fall below 
statewide teacher salary averages. 
 
According to the School District, 
expenditures on administration were 
also declining, but they counted the 
cost of the Teaching and Learning 
Network (TLN), professional 
development specialists based at the 
cluster, as an instructional expense. 
Critics who counted the TLN among 
“administrative” costs contended that 
expenditures on administration actually 
grew over the course of Children 
Achieving.75 Whether administrative 
costs grew or not, there was no doubt 
that the number of staff assigned to the 
central office was smaller at the end of 
the reform than it was before it. To 
close a budget deficit, over 350 
administrative jobs were cut in fiscal 
year 1997.76 One district leader told us 
that his staff of nine had been a staff of 
nearly 300 a decade earlier.77 
 
The School District was definitely a 
system of scarce resources. This scarcity 
limited the School District’s ability to 
provide time for teachers and other 
                                                          
74 Ibid, p. 29. 
 
75 See, for example: S. Snyder, “No cash crisis in 
schools: Philadelphia’s problem is management, says 
an accounting firm hired by the state legislature.” 
The Philadelphia Inquirer (1998, November 13). T. 
Kirsch, “President’s message: We are fighting back 
— Together and we’ve got to win!” PFT Reporter. 
http://www.pft.org/pres798.html. 
 
76 School District of Philadelphia, Realities converge, 
revisited, p. 27. 
 
77 Field notes, January 28, 1997. 
District personnel to receive 
professional development, to develop 
curriculum, and to work with 
colleagues. It also hampered the 
District’s ability to compete to hire the 
most qualified personnel. Teachers, in 
particular, had to make a real 
commitment to urban education (or 
find themselves unable to obtain a job 
in a wealthy suburb) to justify the lower 
starting salary, which was further 
reduced by the city tax on wages. 
Scarce resources also limited the ability 
of the School District to provide up-to-
date curriculum materials and 
technology. For example, a major effort 
to wire every school for computer 
networking and Internet access was 
delayed when the District discovered 
that, although it could pay for 
installation, it did not have enough 
money to operate the networks. And 
budget hearings in both 1996 and in 
1999 revolved around parent and 
student testimony that textbooks in the 
schools were inadequate and out of 
date. 
 
HUMAN CAPITAL 
 
The capacity of the central office to 
support the Children Achieving reforms 
was an issue not only of financial 
resources, but also of human capital. 
With the exception of a few key 
leaders, knowledge about the 
substance of the reforms and the 
expertise to implement them was 
generally limited, even in the central 
office. While many central office staff 
members were passionately committed 
to Children Achieving, some had only a 
superficial understanding of the reforms 
they were supposed to help schools 
implement. And much of what they 
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were trying to implement existed only 
in theory prior to Children Achieving. 
 
At the outset of Children Achieving, 
systemic reform was a fairly new 
concept nationally and few anticipated 
the demands it would place on teachers 
and schools. In Philadelphia, very little 
attention was paid to the professional 
development of central office staff. This 
was clear when, in autumn 1996, some 
central office leaders were still 
questioning whether standards were 
curriculum.78 Most of the 
Superintendent’s inner circle was 
knowledgeable and thoughtful about 
standards-based, systemic reform, but 
many other staff at the central office 
did not have a clear understanding of 
these areas. As one member of the 
Superintendent’s inner circle put it, 
using the SAT-9 assessment categories 
to rate the capacity of the central 
office,  
 
The capacity is ‘basic to below basic.’ 
The primary reason for this is [central 
office personnel] never have spent the 
considerable amount of time it takes 
with people at the cluster level and 
school level to evolve a shared 
understanding of what change is about. 
For example, they have spent time 
developing standards without time 
spent with folks discussing instructional 
approaches. Each individual has been 
left to invent this, and so there is an 
unevenness with what people have 
developed and sometimes there is also 
inconsistency.79 
 
                                                          
78 Field notes, November 12, 1996. 
 
79 Field notes, April 1997. 
 
Another told us: 
 
I looked at schools and clusters and 
despite their best efforts, they needed 
a boost — direct, hands-on 
intervention, and I found that we didn’t 
have the capacity to do that.80 
 
Limited knowledge was just one 
explanation for this inability to provide 
“direct, hands-on intervention.” Other 
human capital issues affected central 
office capacity. Budget cuts resulting 
from the tight financial resources of the 
School District, as well as the shift to 
the cluster structure, had decreased the 
number of staff in the central office, so 
there were fewer people available to 
do more, and increasingly demanding, 
work. The focus on the Children 
Achieving core value of “doing it all at 
once” also tied up central office staff in 
an endless rollout of initiatives, as 
described earlier. 
 
Poor personnel decisions and turnover 
in staff also limited central office 
capacity. The Associate Superintendent 
in charge of the initial development of 
the reform and the leader of the 
Superintendent’s transition team 
resigned in protest over the 
Superintendent’s insistence on 
promoting teacher accountability. A 
well-regarded central office leader was 
demoted for refusing to submit a 
resignation letter early in the reform. A 
deputy superintendent retired. Over 
the course of the reform, there were 
three different leaders of the Office of 
Leadership and Learning, four directors 
of Information Technology (including 
two acting directors), three directors of 
the Office of Best Practices, three 
                                                          
80 Field notes, November 1998. 
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Managing Directors, and two directors 
of the Office of Curriculum Support. 
Additionally, in late 1998, two key 
leaders of external partner groups left 
Philadelphia to pursue new positions 
elsewhere, further isolating the School 
District from key constituencies. Their 
replacements maintained relationships 
with the central office, but they were 
not as close to the Superintendent and 
their presence was not as strong. 
 
Staffing turnover and ineffective 
leadership over the course of the 
reform plagued the departments most 
directly responsible for providing 
support to the field — the Office of 
Leadership and Learning, the Office of 
Curriculum Support, and the Office of 
Best Practices. Staff hired to fill these 
vacancies were not, in general, 
compatible with other members of the 
leadership group and some gained 
reputations as “stallers” — people who 
put up obstacles to reform.81 One 
central office leader admitted, “Central 
office personnel decisions have not 
been good ones.”82 
 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
Social capital is a product of 
relationships among people. For 
example, a group of people that trusts 
each other has a form of social capital. 
All other things being equal, a trusting 
group is more likely to succeed at a 
given task than a group whose 
members do not trust each other.83 In 
this section, we describe some 
                                                          
81 Field notes, July 3, 1997. 
 
82 Field notes, November 1999. 
 
83 Spillane and Thompson, “Reconstructing 
conceptions of local capacity.” 
challenges to the development of social 
capital in the School District of 
Philadelphia. We focus on the culture of 
the District and its history of reliance on 
line authority and the relationship of 
the central administration with its 
potential partners. 
 
LINE AUTHORITY 
 
Establishing and respecting line 
authority — a system where power and 
influence were defined by the number 
of staff one controlled — was a strong 
cultural norm in the administration of 
Hornbeck’s predecessor, Constance 
Clayton. The goal of Children Achieving 
to foster local control and “turn the 
School District on its head,” was a 
direct challenge to that long-held and 
strongly-embedded belief. The 
selection of the Superintendent himself, 
who was educated as both a lawyer and 
a minister, but not as an educator, was 
the first in a series of decisions that 
flouted this hierarchical system. 
 
Initially, the “new” central office was 
simply layered over the old, creating 
two parallel worlds, the reform world 
and the old world. This concern 
became apparent as work teams, 
established to design, plan, and 
implement Children Achieving, found 
their plans frustrated by the “stallers” in 
key support departments, such as 
finance, information technology, and 
transportation.84 One central office 
leader noted that “the other offices do 
not get reflected in the workplans or 
the goals or,” his colleague finished his 
sentence, “in change. It benefits them 
to be left out.” While at first there was 
                                                          
84 Field notes, July 3, 1997. 
 
30       Contradictions and Control in Systemic Reform 
 
some reluctance to try to integrate 
Children Achieving into the fabric of 
District operations, the District’s reform 
leaders concluded that they must try. 
As one meeting participant noted, “It’s 
a big task, but it’s essential. When we 
do not do that, one part of the system 
is doing Children Achieving and one is 
doing standard work.”85 Eventually, with 
the help of external partners, the 
central office succeeded in integrating 
Children Achieving into the goals and 
operating budget of the whole School 
District, but not until halfway through 
the reform effort. 
 
The importance of line authority 
continued to assert itself throughout 
the reform, however. Initially, cluster 
leaders were envisioned as “critical 
friends” for principals, and so were not 
required to have the authority to rate 
principals in annual evaluations. But, 
cluster leaders who lacked rating 
authority found that many principals 
ignored them. They clamored for a 
superintendency certificate so they 
would be the line officer for principals 
and could have some kind of influence 
in the schools in their clusters. By spring 
1997, all cluster leaders were given line 
authority over the principals in their 
cluster.  
 
RELATIONS WITH POTENTIAL 
PARTNERS 
 
The development of social capital in the 
School District was also affected by the 
central administration’s relationships 
with potential partners, including the 
Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, its 
own cluster leaders, state officials, and 
the business community. 
                                                          
85 Field notes, May 8, 1997. 
THE PHILADELPHIA FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS 
 
The School District’s relationship with 
the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers 
(PFT) suffered over the course of 
Children Achieving and was 
characterized by mistrust on both sides. 
In a sense, the School District 
administration was at war with its own 
teachers. The PFT strongly objected to 
key components of Children Achieving, 
particularly to its accountability 
provisions. They objected to spending 
money on cluster staff when they felt 
schools were understaffed. Leadership 
of the PFT felt that Children Achieving 
was a threat to the union and to hard-
won work rules outlined in the teacher 
contract. Tensions were highest when 
the School District administration 
attempted to reconstitute two high 
schools, plans which were ultimately 
halted by an independent arbitrator 
who ruled that the District had failed to 
engage in the necessary consultation 
with the PFT. To PFT representatives, 
the reconstitution attempt was just one 
example of the Hornbeck 
administration’s pattern of excluding 
the PFT from the decision-making 
process.  
 
School District leaders, for their part, 
told us that the PFT representatives 
were invited to meetings about relevant 
policy areas, but they either obstructed 
the meetings they attended or never 
showed up. Central office leaders felt 
that the PFT leadership was adversarial 
and unreasonably attached to the 
unproductive rules and regulations of 
an antiquated contract, and that the 
PFT had the interests of teachers, not 
children, at heart. In our estimation, 
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both groups behaved badly. In four 
years of meeting with and interviewing 
central office staff and PFT 
representatives, we did not hear a 
single positive comment from either 
group about the other. 
 
The acrimony evident on both sides of 
this relationship made progress 
difficult. The School District and the 
PFT were unable to agree on 
contractual changes that would have 
supported Children Achieving, 
especially in the area of 
decentralization. School communities 
could not select their own principals 
and staff, as Children Achieving 
advocated, and there was conflicting 
language about local school councils in 
the Children Achieving plan and the 
PFT contract.86 Additionally, the failure 
of the School District to gain 
concessions from the PFT undermined 
its credibility with a number of 
stakeholders, particularly with principals 
and the business community.   
 
CLUSTER PERSONNEL 
 
In addition to an antagonistic 
relationship with the leadership of the 
Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, 
the School District also often alienated 
its own cluster leaders, who were 
crucial to reform implementation. 
Cluster leaders were, for lack of a 
better term, regional superintendents, 
who under Children Achieving’s new 
                                                          
86 The language of Children Achieving called for 35 
percent of households to vote to determine council 
membership; in the teachers’ contract the provision 
was for five parents to be selected by the Home and 
School Association. Additionally, Children Achieving 
called for two-year terms for parents, while the 
contract outlined one-year terms for teachers. See 
Christman, Guidance for school improvement in a 
decentralizing system. 
organizational structure, were 
supposed to improve and align 
instruction across a feeder pattern of 
schools and lead and support local 
professional development and 
community engagement efforts. Cluster 
leaders were members of the 
Superintendent’s cabinet, which also 
included key central office leaders.  
 
With the addition of 22 cluster leaders 
(rather than the six regional 
superintendents), the Cabinet ended up 
being a large group of about 50 
people, a size that was ill-suited for 
collaborative work. Cluster leaders 
came to describe Cabinet meetings as 
the place they came to talk about 
decisions that were already made by 
central office staff. Cabinet meetings 
were also one of the few forums they 
had to air their grievances: Central 
office staff often felt “ganged up on” 
by cluster leaders.87 For example, one 
Cabinet meeting was particularly 
contentious. Cluster leaders were upset 
that more information was not available 
as to how they would finance and 
organize summer school programs, 
scheduled to begin about three months 
from the time of the meeting. They 
made little effort to hide their anger 
and hostility from researchers present 
at the meeting.88 
 
This tension arose in part because of 
conflicting ideas about the cluster role. 
Whereas central office staff used 
clusters primarily as vehicles for 
informing the field about new aspects 
of the reform, many cluster leaders saw 
their role differently. They resented 
                                                          
87 Personal communication, December 2000. 
 
88 Field notes, March 24, 1999. 
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what they perceived as central office’s 
intrusion on their work agendas. In the 
following excerpt from our field notes, 
a cluster leader illustrates this point: 
  
Part of the challenge I have had as a 
cluster leader is to keep the central 
office away from me, so I can allow my 
people to develop their responsibilities. 
Downtown keeps adding more [stuff] to 
our plate…Let me give you an example. 
The central office wanted to change the 
special ed formula, which apparently 
they had been working on for months, 
but it wasn’t shared with anyone [in the 
field]. When it was finally announced, 
parents went to the Board and begged 
them not to let it happen. So the Board 
then asked the school district what facts 
they have to support the change, so 
now we [cluster staff] have to do a 
lengthy survey. We have to identify one 
special ed kid per special ed classroom 
and review their [education plan], 
observe their classroom, interview the 
parent and teacher, and we have to do 
it all in four weeks. That’s 75 kids for 
me because we have 75 special ed 
classrooms. The central office knew that 
they would ask us to do this in the 
summer, but they didn’t actually ask us 
until a couple of weeks ago. This says 
to me that I have to put a hold on 
everything else I’m doing and do this. It 
takes away from your focus.89  
 
This unproductive dynamic endured 
even when central office staff were 
aware of time and turf concerns and 
made efforts to seek cluster leader 
input and plan with respect to cluster 
schedules. In the 1999-2000 school 
year, the Superintendent asked the 
cluster leaders to support him in a fight 
                                                          
89 Field notes, April 1996. 
for fair funding from the state and they 
refused.  
 
STATE OFFICIALS AND THE BUSINESS 
COMMUNITY 
 
The School District’s relationship with 
state education officials, the Governor, 
and the state legislature also was 
strained over the course of the reform. 
When Hornbeck became 
Superintendent in 1994, there was a 
Democratic Governor and Democratic 
majorities in both houses of the state 
legislature. He came to his position with 
strong backing from both Philadelphia’s 
mayor and its business community. 
However, just three months into his 
administration, the political landscape 
in Pennsylvania and Philadelphia 
changed dramatically: the state elected 
a Republican governor, Tom Ridge, and 
Republican majorities in the state 
legislature who were committed to 
reducing government spending. 
Relationships between the state 
officials and the District were tested by 
the new governor’s advocacy of 
vouchers, his refusal to grant the School 
District significant additional funds, and 
the Superintendent’s inflammatory 
response: allegations of racism on the 
part of state officials via a federal civil 
rights lawsuit against the state. When 
we interviewed state education 
department officials in the fall of 1999, 
their anger toward David Hornbeck was 
evident. 
 
This antagonistic relationship between 
the state and the School District had 
effects on local constituencies, as well. 
The strong backing of the business 
community deteriorated as Hornbeck’s 
battles with the state and its pro-
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business agenda became more public. 
The clearest sign of the fracture in the 
alliance between the business 
community and the School District was 
when Greater Philadelphia First — a 
coalition of Philadelphia business 
executives that served as the fiscal 
agent for the Annenberg Challenge — 
supported Governor Ridge’s plan for 
school vouchers. 
 
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR 
IMPLEMENTATION 
 
The central office’s limited capacity 
naturally had enormous implications for 
the implementation of the reform effort 
and contributed to their retreat from 
decentralization. We discuss below two 
major implementation issues — poor 
sequencing of the reforms and 
underestimation of the time and 
support needed to implement the 
reforms — that were both a result of 
and contributed to the central office’s 
limited capacity to support Children 
Achieving. Table 1, the Reform 
Implementation Timeline, is included 
below to provide a brief guide to the 
timing of major reform initiatives and 
contextual events. 
 
SEQUENCING AND ROLLOUT 
OF THE REFORMS 
 
One of the primary implementation 
flaws of Children Achieving was the 
sequence in which the District rolled 
out the reforms and supports. In order 
to capitalize on the momentum built up 
from the hiring of the new 
Superintendent and the acquisition of 
the Annenberg funds and to fulfill the 
underlying belief to “do it all at once,” 
there was a rush to implementation. 
Another underlying belief, that “strong 
incentives are necessary” to induce 
people to adopt good practices, 
contributed to a full court press to 
develop the accountability system. 
After clusters, the accountability system 
was the first major component of 
reform to be implemented, with 
baseline scores appearing in 1996. 
 
But to many, instituting accountability 
policies before developing the 
infrastructure to support achievement 
was putting the cart in front of the 
horse. School personnel complained 
that they were being held accountable 
for performance targets before 
teachers had received the new 
standards, and before all 22 clusters 
were in place, and long before the 
development of the Curriculum 
Frameworks offered a modicum of 
guidance and summer institutes offered 
teachers rich opportunities to examine 
their practice. All of this contributed to 
perceptions by teachers and principals 
that they were being asked to carry 
disproportionate amounts of the 
burden for improvement. They felt 
victimized by the ways in which the 
reforms were presented and rolled out.
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TABLE 1. REFORM IMPLEMENTATION TIMELINE OF EVENTS:  
CHILDREN ACHIEVING AND THE SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA 
 
August 1994 David Hornbeck begins his tenure as Superintendent. 
June 1995 Annenberg Challenge grant awarded to School District. 
August 1995 First six clusters formally established. 
December 1995 Standards writing teams convened. 
April-May 1996 SAT-9 administered district-wide in grades 2, 4, 6, 8, and 11. 
July 1996 Summer institute (four-day professional development program) conducted for 
teams of teachers on standards-based instruction. 
August 1996 Draft standards distributed to all teachers for review. 
September 1996 16 other clusters established. 
Standards Curriculum Resource Guides distributed to teachers. 
October 1996 School district forecasts $104 million budget shortfall for 1997-1998 school 
year. 
December 1996 Standards in reading/English/language arts, science, mathematics, and the Arts 
officially adopted by Board. 
February 1997 Announcement of plans to reconstitute two high schools. 
Superintendent, Board President, City Council President, and Mayor publicly 
blame state funding formula for financial problems in Philadelphia schools; 
“Draw a line in the sand” pledging no further cuts in school-based programs; 
and file a lawsuit alleging that the state had failed to meet its constitutional 
obligation to provide a thorough and efficient education. 
Spring 1997 Cluster leaders given line authority over the principals in their cluster. 
May 1997 City Council adopts budget that assumes significant new state contribution. 
Draft standards in Health and Physical Education, Social Studies, and world 
languages distributed to all teachers. 
July 1997 Standards in final three subjects adopted by Board. 
Reconstitution decision reversed by arbitrator after appeal by Philadelphia 
Federation of Teachers. 
Summer institute for teachers on content standards for RELA, math, and 
science (1,100 participants). 
September 1997 PRI scores for 1996 and 1997 announced publicly, gains celebrated. 
Week-long professional development session on content standards (600 
participants). 
October 1997 Development of curriculum frameworks begins. 
January 1998 Curriculum frameworks for ELA, math, science, and social studies distributed to 
all schools. 
SAT-9 scores adjusted to correct error by test publisher (two schools removed 
from “low progress” list). 
February 1998 State legislature committee on restructuring Pennsylvania’s urban schools 
proposes break-up of Philadelphia School District. 
March 1998 District forecasts $85 million budget deficit for the 1998-1999 school year. 
District files federal lawsuit against state, alleging civil rights violations based on 
funding formula that discriminates against poor and minority students. 
April 1998 State passes Act 46, colloquially known as the “state takeover bill.” 
SAT-9 administered district-wide in grades 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, and 11. 
May 1998 City Council adopts School District budget, relying on letters of credits from 
banks to avert an early school closure in the 1998-1999 school year. 
June 1998 Board adopts new graduation and promotion supports and requirements. 
July 1998 Annual summer content institute held. 
August 1998 School District celebrates second consecutive year of test score gains. 
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TABLE 1. REFORM IMPLEMENTATION TIMELINE OF EVENTS: 
CHILDREN ACHIEVING AND THE SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA  
(CONTINUED) 
 
September 1998 PRI Cycle 1 rewards and sanctions announced. 
Expert panel appointed to review accountability system. 
January 1999 David Hornbeck’s contract extended for two more years after much 
speculation.  
March 1999 School District presents budget to City Council with projected $94 million 
deficit for 1999-2000 school year; refuses to make further cuts. 
April 1999 Backed by mayor, admission procedures reinstituted for some small learning 
communities. 
SAT-9 administered. 
May 1999 City Council adopts School District budget; state makes “one-time” 
contributions to help cover the deficit. 
July 1999 Annual summer content institute held. 
August 1999 School District announces third year of test score gains, points to “warning 
signs” that progress is waning. 
January 2000 Proficiency exams piloted in grades 9 and 10. 
February 2000 School District projects $200 million deficit for school year 2000-2001. 
April 2000 SAT-9 administered. 
May 2000 City Council adopts budget submitted by board with no new money for the 
programs the Superintendent felt were required to fully implement Children 
Achieving. Consequently, implementation of new supports and requirements 
postponed for promotion from eighth grade and for graduation. 
June 2000 David Hornbeck announces his resignation. 
 
 
 
Central office personnel frequently 
reinforced these perceptions. They 
would often work long and hard to 
produce a tool intended to help school 
or cluster personnel complete a 
necessary function, only to undermine 
their work by failing to contact the field 
in advance and springing the new tool 
on them at the last minute. One central 
office leader described the problems 
with the execution of school-based 
budgeting. 
 
In two recent instances, the execution 
of policy has broken down. One was 
the budget rollout this year. We worked 
very hard inside. The operational 
budget and the categorical budget 
were done together and budget forms 
were done on disk. But the rollout was 
terrible. The presentations were poor 
and the disks were hard to use…The 
policy, the idea, the coordination was 
terrific but the implementation was 
weak.90 
 
Other supports were also rushed in 
their development and implemented in 
questionable sequence. In a late 1998 
policy meeting, central office leaders 
lamented that the Curriculum 
Frameworks had been developed 
before the graduation and promotion 
requirements had been completed. 
What Hess91 might regard as the 
“symbolic” reforms, such as structural 
                                                          
90 Field notes, April 1997. 
 
91 F.M. Hess, Spinning wheels: The politics of urban 
school reform. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 
Press, 1999. 
36       Contradictions and Control in Systemic Reform 
 
changes and accountability 
mechanisms, were implemented first; it 
was not until later that the more 
difficult work of transforming 
classrooms — the proverbial “horse” —  
began. Philadelphia leaders did make 
these so-called ‘symbolic’ changes first, 
but in part it was due to their core 
belief in incentives. Accountability 
mechanisms were developed first 
because they produced the strongest 
incentives for improvement, and 
student achievement did improve 
immediately. However, as central office 
staff began to realize that those 
incentives were not powerful enough to 
improve teaching on a large scale, they 
turned to more prescriptive 
approaches. 
 
UNDERESTIMATION OF TIME 
AND SUPPORT 
 
Transforming instruction to a 
constructivist approach demands much 
of everyone, particularly those who 
work in schools. The architects of 
Children Achieving, and the central 
office staff leading the implementation, 
underestimated how much time and 
support it would require. Transforming 
instruction requires new curriculum and 
deep changes in teaching that occur 
only over extended periods of time and 
with intensive support. The central 
office did not provide teachers with the 
curriculum materials needed to do the 
job, and the accountability system tried 
to push improvement with time 
constraints that were unrealistic. 
Teachers were not trained adequately 
for standards-based instruction, and 
many held beliefs that ran contrary to it. 
Opportunities to participate in content-
based professional development, work 
collaboratively with other teachers, 
observe expert colleagues, and receive 
coaching in their own classrooms were 
eventually increased, but remained 
inadequate to the enormous task and 
the demands of the accountability 
system. 
 
Again, this implementation issue is 
partly attributable to some of the 
beliefs underlying the reform, 
particularly the motto “do it all at 
once.” There was an urgency about the 
reform effort, especially during the 
initial years of Children Achieving, that 
was admirable but that contributed to 
the underestimation of what it would 
take to improve the entire district. The 
urgency stemmed from several sources. 
In the initial months of the reform 
effort, its leaders were driven primarily 
by their passionate desire to improve 
conditions for children. They also 
believed that obtaining additional 
funding hinged on improved 
performance. Later in the reform effort 
this urgency was fed by the state’s 
threat to take over the district.  
 
Faced with these demands, central 
office leaders responded with an 
endless rollout of information about the 
reforms to clusters and schools. They 
acted as though teachers learned 
through knowledge transmission, even 
while they were encouraging teachers 
to use constructivist pedagogy with 
students. Constructivism, as noted 
earlier, rests on the ideas that learning 
is social and requires active 
engagement among teachers and 
learners. While there was 
acknowledgment of the need for this 
approach to student instruction, there 
was little recognition of the need for 
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teachers and other school staff to have 
the same type of learning opportunities 
to help them understand how to 
implement a constructivist, standards-
based system.   
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LESSONS FOR 
REFORMING 
DISTRICTS 
 
 
his report describes how both 
the policies and rhetoric of 
District leaders and central 
office staff in Philadelphia 
changed over the course of the 
Children Achieving reform, shifting 
from a focus on decentralization toward 
a more prescriptive approach. Central 
office personnel saw this as a rational 
response to what they encountered as 
they attempted to implement the 
reforms. The limited capacities and 
willingness of school staffs to 
implement many of the programs were 
major obstacles to reformers. Left to 
their own devices, many school staffs 
floundered and others selected 
strategies that were inconsistent with 
the central office vision, particularly 
with constructivism, the pedagogical 
approach promoted in Children 
Achieving.  
 
Our own research in the schools 
suggests that there were serious 
capacity problems in the schools, and 
there certainly was resistance to some 
of the central tenets of the reform. The 
evaluation team observed many 
examples of dysfunctional school 
communities, well-meaning but under-
prepared teachers and principals, and 
questionable instructional practices that 
sacrificed content and meaning for 
prescription and order. But the capacity 
of school staffs to improve teaching 
and learning was only one of the 
reasons for the shift from school 
autonomy to more central office 
prescription. The second section of this 
report described the insufficient 
capacity of the central office to support 
school-initiated reforms, the flaws in 
implementation that occurred, and the 
contradictions inherent in Philadelphia’s 
theory of action. These problems also 
forced the central office to become 
increasingly reliant on mandates, 
directives, and centralized authority. In 
the end, Philadelphia’s leadership did 
not have the strategic vision, the 
resources, or the patience to support 
school-based reform. 
 
What might other school districts 
undertaking systemic reform learn from 
the Philadelphia experience? Our 
analysis of central office policy, 
implementation, and capacity during 
Children Achieving suggests that school 
districts would probably experience 
greater success if local leaders:  
 
• Clarified roles and values; 
 
• Acknowledged the varying 
capacities of personnel at all levels 
of the district; 
 
• Collaborated with and showed 
respect for stakeholders; 
 
• Understood how schools perceived 
standards; 
 
• Maintained focus and managed the 
burden on school employees; and 
 
• Recognized the trade-offs between 
alignment and autonomy. 
 
We elaborate on these lessons in the 
remainder of this report.  
 
T
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CLARIFY ROLES AND 
VALUES 
 
The implementation of Children 
Achieving was hampered from the 
beginning by conflicts between the 
basic beliefs underlying the reform and 
the roles assigned to the central office 
in plans for carrying it out. Early in this 
report we identified five foundational 
values underlying Children Achieving — 
the primacy of results, the importance 
of equity, the value of increased school 
autonomy, the need for strong 
incentives, and the imperative to “do it 
all at once.” We also discussed the four 
roles assigned to the central office in 
the Children Achieving Strategic Action 
Design: setting standards, building 
capacity, holding schools accountable, 
and monitoring equity. Each of these 
roles offered opportunities for central 
office staff to assume increased 
authority and reduce school autonomy. 
Given the early implementation 
problems, the resistance of the 
teachers’ union, and the vast majority of 
school employees to components of 
the reforms, and the promise to 
produce results, it is understandable 
that the central office staff were 
tempted to take full advantage of these 
roles to specify the reforms in the 
schools. Initially, the capacity-building 
role was most problematic for central 
office staff. It seemed to be in direct 
conflict with the core values of school 
autonomy and focusing on results. 
Capacity-building implies provision of 
guidance and guidance implies 
direction.  
 
Two of the other central office roles — 
holding schools accountable and 
monitoring equity — were closely 
linked in Children Achieving’s theory of 
action. Our analysis shows that the early 
results from the accountability system, 
combined with a strong emphasis on 
equity, led the central office to develop 
stronger and more prescriptive signals 
to schools about what and how to 
teach. Annual student achievement 
testing revealed inequities associated 
with race and ethnicity, family income, 
and language background. Despite 
their commitments to autonomy and 
results, central office personnel 
convinced themselves that more 
prescriptive approaches were necessary 
to ensure that all students had fair 
opportunities to learn. Outcomes could 
not be separated from opportunities to 
learn. As the central office became 
more prescriptive in the name of 
equity, they became increasingly less 
concerned about ensuring that school 
personnel had the freedom to make 
their own decisions.  
 
Of course successful implementation of 
reforms does not mean blindly 
following an initial plan. Indeed, some 
authors identify the ability to alter plans 
as an important characteristic of 
successful implementation.92 However, 
we believe that Philadelphia’s shift to 
more prescriptive approaches reflected 
confusion about central office roles and 
values, distrust of school personnel and 
the absence of a coherent capacity-
building strategy rather than a 
thoughtful response to the needs of the 
field. Prescription itself is not always 
bad, nor is school autonomy always 
desirable. However, once roles and 
responsibilities for carrying out reforms 
                                                          
92 For example, see R.F. Elmore, “Getting to scale 
with good educational practice.” Harvard 
Educational Review, 66 (1996), pp. 1-26.   
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were defined, staff needed reasonable 
opportunities to enact them. This 
meant time, materials, and training. It 
also meant maintaining some 
coherence in policies and actions. In 
Philadelphia, the initial rhetoric about 
decentralization was not matched with 
the time or support needed to make it 
work. Instead, as school staffs struggled 
to understand and use their newly-
granted autonomy, they were almost 
immediately overwhelmed with new 
central office mandates. This shift bred 
anger, mistrust, cynicism, and 
resistance in the schools and it 
ultimately undermined the 
implementation of the reforms.   
 
Other districts embarking on systemic 
reform should delineate roles and 
responsibilities carefully, and should 
then act in a coherent and consistent 
manner. Assignments should be based 
on hard-headed assessments of 
capacity and motivation to improve 
rather than ideological commitments to 
ideas like decentralization. Leaders 
should avoid assigning responsibilities 
to employees who lack either the 
knowledge or motivation to carry them 
out. Rather, they should provide the 
direction, scaffolding, tools, materials, 
training, and incentives necessary to 
help acquire increased competence as 
they make progress. The experience of 
success can be a powerful motivator to 
acquire new knowledge and skill.   
 
ACKNOWLEDGE VARYING 
CAPACITY 
 
Another lesson from Children Achieving 
is that both district and school capacity 
must be considered before taking on 
large-scale reform. School and cluster 
personnel perceived Children Achieving 
as a one-size-fits-all reform effort. 
Everyone had to do it all, all at once, 
and all the same way. Despite early 
efforts to give schools more autonomy, 
teachers and principals experienced the 
reforms as mandates from above. 
Promises to allow some flexibility in 
how reform initiatives like small learning 
communities were carried out were set 
aside when district-wide standards were 
set and then used for evaluative 
purposes. Some school and cluster 
personnel bristled at central guidance 
that they felt disregarded the 
experience of principals and the 
expertise of teachers, while others 
clamored for more guidance. Similarly, 
Children Achieving assumed that all 
central office staff had the knowledge 
and ability needed to design and lead 
their parts of the reform effort. 
 
Like schools, central offices, depending 
on their staffing and other resources, 
vary in their capacity to define and 
support reform. The School District of 
Philadelphia did not have the capacity 
to take on such an ambitious reform 
effort, at any level of the system, and 
insufficient efforts were made to 
improve the system’s capacity. The 
School District lacked the finances 
needed to conduct its regular operation 
and, hence, supports for the reform 
initiatives were often under-funded. 
Resource scarcity limited the School 
District’s ability to provide time for 
teachers and other District personnel to 
receive professional development, to 
develop curriculum, and to work with 
colleagues. It also hampered the 
District’s ability to hire qualified 
personnel for key positions in schools 
and in the central office. High turnover 
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in key staff positions and cuts in 
administrative staff based at the central 
office further exacerbated the capacity 
problem. 
 
Other districts should address this issue 
upfront when planning large-scale 
reform efforts. To do this, districts 
might sequence the implementation of 
components so that support can be 
concentrated, spend more time 
educating personnel about reform 
elements prior to implementation, and 
delay accountability consequences until 
personnel have received sufficient 
opportunities to develop the necessary 
skills and the tools needed to do the 
work. 
 
COLLABORATE WITH AND 
SHOW RESPECT FOR 
STAKEHOLDERS 
 
The District’s limited capacity to 
support Children Achieving was not 
simply a matter of scarce fiscal 
resources. Lack of skill in negotiating 
relationships with constituencies such 
as the Philadelphia Federation of 
Teachers, the state, and the business 
community contributed to conflicts that 
had extremely negative impacts on the 
implementation of Children Achieving.  
These conflicts might have been 
avoided or managed more effectively.  
Teaching, even within small learning 
communities, is demanding work and it 
is by and large private work. Its efficacy 
depends on both the commitment and 
the competence of the practitioner. If 
you attack them as a group, you will not 
gain their commitment. If you do not 
provide them with timely opportunities 
to acquire new skills and with the tools 
they need, you will not build their 
confidence that they are competent to 
make the changes. If you send them 
mixed messages, they will rely on the 
approaches they know best.  The 
Philadelphia District leaders did all of 
these things and failed to win the 
commitment of their teaching force to 
the reforms. Philadelphia leadership 
consistently underestimated the 
importance of developing and 
maintaining relationships with these 
important stakeholders. They 
discounted constituent perspectives, 
experiences, and ultimately, their 
power to hurt or help the School 
District. Other districts considering 
systemic reform efforts should work to 
collaborate with key stakeholders 
whenever possible and, at minimum, 
give respect to their perspectives and 
experiences. 
 
MAINTAIN FOCUS 
 
Perhaps the most compelling and most 
onerous belief underlying Children 
Achieving was that all aspects of the 
reform had to be implemented at once. 
Hornbeck’s assertions that every part of 
the system plays a role in student 
achievement, that piecemeal reform 
does more harm than good, and that 
comprehensive efforts were needed to 
achieve significant improvement initially 
inspired Philadelphians. While it is true 
that enormous effort is needed to 
transform troubled urban school 
systems, as Children Achieving wound 
down, it became clear that “doing it all 
at once” had been an ill-conceived 
strategy. 
  
“Doing it all at once” stretched the 
limited capacity of the system to the 
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breaking point by asking District 
personnel to design, implement, and 
understand a large set of reforms in 
quick succession. It contributed to poor 
sequencing and mixed signals. Since 
everything was a priority, the time and 
support required to implement various 
components of reform was routinely 
underestimated. Reform overload 
became a major obstacle to successful 
implementation. There was little time to 
prepare the ground for the reforms, to 
build capacity, or to receive feedback 
from the field and review and revise 
policy. It is not surprising that, to 
schools and clusters, central office 
policies felt like unsupported mandates. 
The core value of “doing it all at once” 
increased the sense of top-down 
control by the central office, conflicting 
with the initial efforts to increase school 
autonomy and leading to further 
centralization. 
 
Children Achieving illustrates how focus 
can be lost when a sweeping vision and 
ambitious improvement plans are 
pursued at a furious pace. Staff at all 
levels of the District expressed 
frustration with reform overload. Our 
research and the research literature in 
general are clear that maintaining focus 
over time is essential to substantive 
educational improvement. This was 
difficult in Philadelphia due to the 
number of reforms being implemented 
simultaneously and the gaps between 
the amount of time provided to 
implement them and what was actually 
needed. Other districts attempting to 
take on ambitious reforms should not 
sacrifice their strategic vision of system-
wide transformation, but they should 
think through how they sequence their 
actions, and keep the burdens 
manageable. 
 
USE STANDARDS 
CAREFULLY 
 
Under Children Achieving, one of the 
functions of the central office was to set 
standards. As the central office staff 
recognized the need to provide schools 
with more guidance about how to carry 
out the reforms, they drew on this 
authority. In addition to content and 
performance standards, the central 
office staff defined “process” standards 
that spelled out acceptable practice in 
a variety of areas. They set standards 
for local school councils, small learning 
communities, professional 
development, teaching practice, 
project learning, service learning, the 
comprehensive support process, and so 
on. These standards were perceived by 
central office staff as a benign form of 
guidance, and as different from 
mandates. Standards, in their view, 
implied advocacy for quality rather than 
exercise of authority and control.   
 
However, to school staff, these 
“process” standards were just 
prescriptions in another form. And as 
cluster and central office staff used 
these various sets of standards to 
determine whether schools were 
complying with the reforms, they clearly 
were viewed as regulatory mandates.  
Simply calling them standards did not 
change the fact that they felt like 
regulations to the school staffs. 
 
Other districts can learn from this 
experience. If the idea of standards is 
to define an ideal state of affairs, then 
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deviation should be expected across 
contexts. This is especially true of 
“process” standards. In a decentralized 
environment, the central office can 
simply acknowledge that there will be 
deviations across contexts, maybe even 
encourage it, and focus on results 
rather than compliance, or they can 
define the parameters of acceptable 
behavior and the conditions under 
which deviations will be permitted. But 
it is probably important to distinguish 
between how standards and regulations 
are applied, and what the 
consequences are for deviation. The 
former imply some professional 
legitimacy, some basis in knowledge or 
experience, but also targets to be 
worked toward rather than rules to be 
complied with.     
 
RECOGNIZE THE TRADE-
OFF BETWEEN ALIGNMENT 
AND AUTONOMY 
 
The problems of implementation were 
serious in Philadelphia, but we have 
concluded that there was a design flaw 
in Children Achieving that was even 
more serious. As described in the 
introduction to this report, systemic 
reform assumes well-aligned 
accountability and assessment systems 
and local control and development of 
curriculum. The idea is that a central 
authority (a state, or in Philadelphia’s 
case, the School District’s central office) 
sets content and performance 
standards and holds schools 
accountable, but gives schools the 
opportunity to determine the best 
means of reaching those standards. In 
theory this includes control over their 
budgets, their personnel, and their 
curriculum. What we believe to be the 
flaw in this theory is that high-stakes 
accountability and assessment systems 
are not tolerant of diverse curricula. If 
schools are to be held accountable for 
what students learn, the assessment 
system must be aligned with what 
teachers teach. There are two ways this 
alignment can be achieved: the central 
authority can prescribe the curriculum 
or it can create strong incentives for 
teachers to align their curricula with the 
assessment. If the assessment offers no 
options and measures specific 
knowledge and skill, then the results 
are similar in either case. The concepts, 
facts, and skills children should know 
and be able to do (as identified in 
content standards), and the specific 
subject matter, learning activities, and 
their general sequence, are prescribed 
either through curriculum policy or 
assessment specifications. Central 
office staff may tell school staff that 
they should attend to the content 
standards rather than to the test. They 
may tell them that they have the 
freedom to develop their own curricula 
based on the content standards. Initially 
in Philadelphia, with the stakes high 
and teachers’ confidence in students 
low, schools chose to focus on the SAT-
9 test and opt for test preparation as 
the core curriculum. Later, the central 
office began to see tests as “the tail 
that wags the dog” and strove to use 
assessments in lieu of curriculum to 
specify curriculum and restructure 
courses of study.  
  
We are not suggesting that centralizing 
curriculum is a better way to reform 
schools. Rather, what our experience in 
Philadelphia reveals is that there is a 
trade-off between heavy reliance on 
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uniform assessment systems and school 
and teacher control over curricular 
content in high-stakes accountability 
environments. Paradoxically, systemic 
reform promises high alignment and 
high autonomy. It cannot deliver both. 
 
The Philadelphia central office staff 
lived out this contradiction as they 
worked to implement Children 
Achieving. Initially, they focused on 
decentralizing authority to schools, and 
giving school staff opportunities to 
make their own decisions. They set 
standards and established an 
accountability mechanism that included 
incentives for schools to improve their 
performance. They were criticized 
because the test they selected did not 
match their standards perfectly, so they 
worked to improve the alignment. They 
were also criticized because the 
accountability system seemed to be 
encouraging increased test preparation 
in the District’s classrooms. Some, in 
turn, criticized the teachers for their 
failure to understand that the creative 
constructivist approaches would work 
better than test preparation. 
 
As results from the testing pointed out 
the wide disparities in outcomes and 
fair opportunities to learn for low-
income students, students of color, and 
English language learners, the central 
office sought to even the playing field 
by further tightening the alignment 
between what was tested and what was 
taught. As the Hornbeck administration 
came to an end, central office staff and 
the Board of Education were 
developing new tests in every subject 
area for grades 7-12. These tests were 
intended to clearly signal to teachers 
what to teach. The shift from a 
decentralized approach to curriculum to 
a highly centralized one was complete, 
and it was the District’s response to the 
trade-off between alignment and 
autonomy. 
 
Mandating a specific curriculum or 
creating tests that drive the curriculum 
are two of the options facing school 
districts trying to promote system-wide 
reform. These ideas lack appeal to 
progressive educators who value 
teacher and school autonomy and 
creativity. Giving schools and teachers 
complete authority over what they 
teach is another option, but it would 
leave districts with no way to compare 
schools or to identify and remedy 
inequities in the distribution of 
achievement. This option also ignores 
the lesson laid out earlier in this section, 
about the need to acknowledge the 
varying capacities of schools and 
teachers. Some teachers and some 
schools, provided the opportunity, 
would do well given the chance to plan 
all their curricular activities and the 
resources to enact them, but others 
would flounder. Not every school’s staff 
is equally ready for nor able to 
capitalize on the responsibility that 
accompanies this degree of autonomy. 
 
If both alignment and autonomy are 
valued, school districts could design 
more flexible policies that address the 
need for both. For example, districts 
might create curricula that cover some 
proportion of the school year, perhaps 
50 percent. District-wide assessments 
would focus on the mandated 
curriculum. For the other half of the 
year, schools and teachers would be 
free to develop and follow their own 
curricula and assessments. Another 
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option would be to trade off alignment 
for autonomy by giving schools that 
meet rigorous performance criteria — 
including performance on standardized 
tests, as well as other, more qualitative 
measures of achievement and capacity 
— freedom from some or all of the 
curricular or testing requirements. Yet a 
third option would be to offer schools 
alternative assessments and let them 
determine which best aligns with the 
curriculum of their choice. A fourth is to 
offer teachers and students options 
within a common assessment 
framework. This is the approach used 
successfully by the Cambridge 
Overseas Evaluation Syndicate. The 
current trend seems to be to pursue 
tighter alignment at the expense of 
school autonomy, but if the 
Philadelphia experience is any guide, 
this may not be the most fruitful choice. 
 
 
 
 
Contradictions and Control in Systemic Reform       47 
 
REMAINING 
QUESTIONS AND 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
he Philadelphia School District 
is the nation’s sixth largest with 
nearly 215,000 students — 80 
percent of whom are children of 
color, and 80 percent of whom live in 
poverty. Philadelphia's composition and 
problems are fairly typical of other 
large urban districts: problems such as 
limited finances, poor labor relations, 
and deteriorating support from key 
constituencies. Educators, researchers, 
and policymakers who are considering 
the implementation of system-wide 
reform face the challenges of 
translating a broad vision into practice, 
and doing it in a timely way before yet 
another generation of students is left 
behind.   
 
It is hard to improve education practice 
system-wide in a large school district. It 
is hard because policymakers cannot 
mandate the commitment and 
motivation required of teachers and 
students. It is hard because systemic 
reform requires a focused effort to 
build internal capacity. It is hard 
because fundamental changes in 
attitudes, beliefs, and traditional 
practices are required. It is hard 
because these are costly endeavors and 
urban school districts need additional 
resources and political support to make 
these changes happen. It is hard 
because it takes time to make the 
changes in teaching and learning 
needed to produce meaningful results. 
 
 
The School District of Philadelphia is 
one of the few large urban school 
districts that has attempted an 
ambitious systemic reform without 
being mandated to do so by a court, 
state, or mayoral takeover.  Although 
many mistakes were made in theory, 
design, and implementation, Children 
Achieving offered some positive lessons 
as well. Urban school district leaders 
can, as Philadelphia has shown us, offer 
a vision of improvement, reorganize an 
entrenched bureaucracy, and 
implement standards and 
accountability. Understanding how to 
encourage and create widespread 
improvements in teaching and learning 
is the next crucial step. While Children 
Achieving fell far short of the vision of 
re-energized learning communities that 
motivated its architects, it did raise 
expectations for the city’s children and 
reframed the debates about the future 
of public education in Philadelphia. 
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